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THE LAST LECTURE: STATE ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
CHARLES W. ADAMS† & MBILIKE M. MWAFULIRWA††
INTRODUCTION
An old proverb says that “when the student is ready[,] the
teacher appears.”1 In this collaborative effort, a civil procedure
law professor has partnered with his former student to address
one of the most challenging topics to confront the federal courts
in recent times: whether state anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The acronym “SLAPP”
stands for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.”3
Anti-SLAPP statutes are a spate of state legislation of recent
vintage, designed “to give more breathing space for free speech
about contentious public issues” and to “try to decrease the
‘chilling effect’ of certain kinds of libel litigation and other
speech-restrictive litigation.”4 The most stringent anti-SLAPP
statutes serve strong measures to accomplish their goals: an
accelerated dismissal procedure soon after suit is filed; a
complete stay of discovery; the plaintiff must, at the pleading
stage, come forward with evidence to establish her prima facie
†
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1
YOGI RAMACHARAKA, FOURTEEN LESSONS IN YOGI PHILOSOPHY AND ORIENTAL
OCCULTISM 271 (1911).
2
Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d
1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he federal-law issue of whether to apply anti-SLAPP
statutes like the OCPA in federal court is a challenging one and has divided the
circuits.” (emphasis added)); Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 791 F.3d
729, 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (whether anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with Rule 12(d), and
with other features of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has produced
disagreement among federal appellate judges).
3
See, e.g., La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2020).
4
Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(quoting EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 118
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014)).
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trial burden; mandatory attorney’s fees and costs to the
prevailing defendant; and an immediate appeal if the trial court
denies the dismissal motion.5
By their design and effect, however, anti-SLAPP statutes
operate differently than the governing rules in federal courts: the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ordinarily, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need not marshal evidence at
the pleading stage, just a statement of facts showing her
entitlement to relief.6
Discovery is generally available.7
Summary judgment only tests whether there are factual disputes
warranting a trial, and the trial court does not weigh any
evidence.8 There is generally no immediate right to appeal a
denial of a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment.9 And
unless a prevailing party can point to an independent source—
like a statute or contract—tied to the claim at issue, there is
generally no right to attorney’s fees for a prevailing party.10
When professor and student last explored this question in
law school in 2011, the relationship between anti-SLAPP
statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil was largely academic. At
the time, only three circuit courts had addressed the issue—the
First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits—and all had reached the same
conclusion: the two sets of laws could co-exist.11 Thus, in our civil
5

Id.; see also Intercon Sols., 791 F.3d at 731.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677–78 (2009).
7
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
8
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 56.
9
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501, 506 (2015) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1291) (“An order granting a motion for summary judgment is final [for
appeal purposes]; an order denying [summary judgment] is not.”); see generally Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (order denying motion to dismiss is
not appealable); see also Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (in
general, only final decisions of district courts are appealable).
10
See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (the
“American Rule,” under which each party pays her own attorney regardless of which
party prevails, is “[o]ur basic point of reference”) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)); cf. Horowitz v. 148 S. Emerson Assocs., 888 F.3d 13,
25–26, 26 n.6 (2d Cir. 2018) (generally, “attorneys’ fees are available . . . only if the
underlying cause of action itself allows for attorneys’ fees.” (emphasis added)).
11
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Henry v. Lake
Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 169, 183 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying
Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86–87, 91 (1st Cir.
2010) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning).
6
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procedure class in 2011, this topic was largely abstract and only
applied to a few federal courts.
That is not so today. Multiple states have since passed antiSLAPP statutes,12 and several federal courts have had a chance
to weigh-in on their application. What result? The federal
appellate courts have badly split on whether anti-SLAPPs (and
their unique early dismissal regimes) can co-exist with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some, like the First and the
Ninth Circuits, hold that they can co-exist;13 while a different

12

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to -752 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-63-501 to -508 (West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16 (West 2015); see
La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2020) (held inapplicable in federal
court); but see Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (applying same anti-SLAPP statute in
federal court); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-1101 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-196a (West 2019); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012), (held
inapplicable in federal court); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337
(D.C. Cir. 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 to 8138; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 768.295, 720.304 (West 2015, 2010); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-11.1 (West 2016)
(held inapplicable in federal court); Carbone v. Cable News Network, 910 F.3d 1345,
1347 (11th Cir. 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 634F-1 to -4; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 110/1 to /99 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (West 2021); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (West 2012); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (held
applicable in federal court), Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164,
169 (5th Cir. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West
2021); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02 (West 2021) (invalidated on constitutional
grounds), Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W. 2d 623, 635–36
(Minn. 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2521,241 to ,246 (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.660 (West 2015) (held
applicable in federal court); Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2-9.1 to .2 (West 2021) (held inapplicable in federal court);
Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 661 (10th Cir.
2018); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 1430 to 1440 (West 2017) (judicially revised); Krimbill v. Talarico, 417 P.3d
1240, 1246 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.150 to .152 (West
2010); 27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301 to 8305 (West 2001); 9 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1003 (West
1997); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.003, 27.005 to .007 (West 2019)
(held inapplicable in federal court); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 244 (5th Cir.
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1403 to -1405 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1041 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.510 to .525 (West 2021) (held
unconstitutional in Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 871–74 (Wash. 2015)), abrogated on
other grounds by Maytown Sand and Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 423 P.3d 223,
247–48 (Wash. 2018). See also Jack B. Harrison, Erie Slapp Back, 95 WASH. L. REV.
1253, 1263 n.63 (2020); accord MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER: ANTI-SLAPP
COMMITTEE, https://medialaw.org/committee/anti-slapp-committee/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2022) (collecting state laws and case law).
13
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973; Godin, 629 F.3d at 86–87.
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complement—the Second, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and the D.C.
Circuits—all hold they cannot.14 This is the lay of the land.
Few cases better highlight the complexity that anti-SLAPP
statutes have wrought on the federal courts than Clifford v.
Trump.15 Clifford is a defamation action brought by adult
entertainer Stephanie Clifford, known under the alias “Stormy
Daniels,” against President Donald J. Trump.16 According to her
complaint, Ms. Daniels “began an intimate relationship with Mr.
Trump in the summer of 2006.”17 The complaint alleged that
after Ms. Daniels agreed to an interview with In Touch Magazine
about her alleged affair with Mr. Trump in 2011, a stranger
threatened her and her infant daughter.18 The complaint alleged
that a man confronted Ms. Daniels in a parking lot telling her,
“Leave Trump alone. Forget the story.”19 According to the
complaint, the man then said, “That’s a beautiful little girl. It’d
be a shame if something happened to her mom.”20 Ms. Daniels
understood the man’s statements to amount to direct threats.
That experience, Ms. Daniels’ complaint alleged, left her
shaken.21
Ms. Daniels released a sketch of her alleged assailant to the
press, but the next day—as her complaint alleged—President
Trump accused her of lying.22 Tweeting to millions of his
followers, the president claimed23:

14
See La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 87–88; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333; Carbone, 910 F.3d
at 1349–50; Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245–46; Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 673 (holding that
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable).
15
See generally 339 F. Supp. 3d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
16
See id. at 919.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Complaint at ¶ 8, Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-cv06893).
20
Id. ¶¶ 8–11.
21
Id. ¶ 10.
22
Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 919.
23
Id.; See also Aaron Blake, Trump’s First Tweet about Stormy Daniels Makes
No Sense–and He May Even Regret It, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/18/trumps-first-tweetabout-stormy-daniels-makes-no-sense-and-he-may-regret-it/.
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After seeing the president’s tweet, Ms. Daniels filed
defamation claims against the president in the Southern District
of New York.24
At the time, Attorney Michael Avenatti
represented Ms. Daniels.
Her complaint alleged that the
president was still a New York resident, while Ms. Daniels was,
at the time, a Texas resident.25 President Trump moved in a
combined motion to transfer venue or to stay or dismiss the case.
The president argued that he and Ms. Daniels had other pending
litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California,26 which had been removed from state court on
diversity of citizenship jurisdictional grounds.27 Meanwhile,
before the Southern District of New York could rule on the
president’s motions, the parties stipulated to a transfer to the
Central District of California.28
Thus, Daniel’s defamation
claims, together with the declaratory judgment case in the
Central District of California, ended up before U.S. District
Judge S. James Otero.29
24

Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 919, 920.
Id. at 920.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Clifford v. Davidson, No. 18-cv-05052, 2018 WL 3701961, at *1–2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018) (recounting some of the parties’ litigation before the same
judge).
28
Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 920.
29
Id.
25
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After the transfer of the case to the Central District of
California, the president moved to dismiss the case based on the
Texas Anti-SLAPP statute(“TCPA”).30 President Trump claimed
that his statements were protected opinion, or merely hyperbole.
Thus, he argued, Ms. Daniel’s lawsuit sought to punish him for
his protected speech. Ms. Daniels countered by arguing that the
TCPA did not apply in federal court. Alternatively, because the
president’s statements were provably false, Ms. Daniels argued,
they were actionable under longstanding law.31 The court
ultimately ruled for President Trump. Applying the test from the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §150, the court ruled
that Ms. Daniels’ Texas domicile was controlling.32 The court
then held that the TCPA applied.33 Employing an abbreviated
analysis, the district court assumed that the TCPA is
functionally the same as the California anti-SLAPP statute.34
The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s established California antiSLAPP precedents and dismissed.35 The court then awarded Mr.
Trump nearly $300,000.00 in fees, costs, and sanctions based on
the TCPA.36
After the attorney’s fee and sanctions award against Ms.
Daniels, and following a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship with Mr. Avenatti, she decided to replace him with a
different attorney: Clark Brewster. Ms. Daniels retained the
firm of Brewster & De Angelis to represent her. 37 Although Mr.
Avenatti filed the notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit of Appeals
and the opening brief,38 Brewster & De Angelis filed the reply
brief,39 and has continued to represent Ms. Daniels since then.

30

Id.
Id. at 925–27.
32
Id. at 921–22 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 (AM.
L. INST. 1971)).
33
Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 921–22.
34
Id. at 921 & n.1.
35
Id. at 922 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med.
Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2018)).
36
See generally Clifford v. Trump, No. CV 18-06893-SJO, 2018 WL 6519029
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2018).
37
Co-author Mbilike M. Mwafulirwa is also an attorney with the Brewster & De
Angelis law firm, who practices appellate law and complex civil litigation.
38
Appellant’s Opening Brief, Clifford v. Trump, 818 F. App’x 746 (9th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-56351).
39
Appellant’s Reply Brief, Clifford v. Trump, 818 F. App’x 746 (9th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-56351).
31
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While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, the Fifth
Circuit issued its long-awaited opinion in Klocke v. Watson.40 The
Fifth Circuit held that the TCPA is inapplicable in federal court
in diversity cases.41 Ms. Daniels filed a Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(j) letter brief with the Ninth Circuit informing it of
the Fifth Circuit’s decision and asking it to adopt that same
position.42 In fact, Ms. Daniels filed two letters impressing that
point on the Ninth Circuit.43
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, however.44 The panel—without
an elaborate analysis—held that the TCPA is functionally the
same as the California anti-SLAPP statute.45 While aware that
the Fifth Circuit had held that the TCPA conflicts with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ninth Circuit panel
believed that it was, essentially, powerless to overturn circuit
precedent.46 Thus, it applied Ninth Circuit precedent to the
TCPA. So, the Ninth Circuit split with the Fifth Circuit on the
applicability of the TCPA in a diversity jurisdiction case. Were it
not for the venue transfer and the choice of law rules, Clifford v.
Trump would likely have been litigated in either the Second or
Fifth Circuit and there never would have been a circuit-split.
Moreover, as the congressionally designated federal appellate
court over Texas, the Fifth Circuit has primary oversight over
Texas law appeals in diversity jurisdiction cases.47 Thus, it is the
exception that the Ninth Circuit hears Texas law diversity
jurisdiction cases.

40

See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 249.
42
A Rule 28(j) letter allows a party to provide supplemental authority to a
federal appellate court after the moving briefs have already been filed. As relevant,
that provision provides: “If pertinent and significant authorities come to a party’s
attention after the party’s brief has been filed--or after oral argument but before
decision--a party may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all
other parties, setting forth the citations.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(j).
43
See generally Letter from Clark Brewster, Partner, Brewster & De Angelis,
P.L.L.C., to Molly Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(Aug. 26, 2019) (on file with authors); Letter from Clark Brewster, Partner, Brewster
& De Angelis, P.L.L.C., to Molly Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Jan. 22, 2019) (on file with authors).
44
Clifford v. Trump, 818 F. App’x 746, 747 (9th Cir. 2020).
45
Id. at 746–47.
46
Id. at 747 (“We are bound to follow our own precedent, which requires us to
apply the TCPA.”).
47
Id.
41
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On the merits, the Ninth Circuit panel—while
acknowledging that one of Trump’s two statements could be
proven true—held that the context of the publication made it
clear that it was protected opinion.48 The panel accordingly
affirmed.49 Ms. Daniels moved for rehearing en banc, but the
Ninth Circuit denied her motion.50 Ms. Daniels then petitioned
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.51 The
question presented in the petition was whether “the TCPA
appl[ies] in Federal Court diversity jurisdiction cases under Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)?”52 But the Court
denied certiorari.53 Thus, the question remains open.54
Against that background, this article aims to contribute four
ideas to the existing body of literature on the rich subject of the
interaction between state anti-SLAPP statutes and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
First, this article explores the Supreme Court’s framework
for determining whether state law applies in diversity
jurisdiction cases after Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates, P.A.
v. Allstate Insurance Co. (“Shady Grove”).55 That analysis
concludes that some federal courts have misread Shady Grove.
We contend that, properly understood, the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion formulation in Shady Grove leaves little room
for most quintessential anti-SLAPP statutes to apply in federal
court.
Second, we delve into the preemption debate: do the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rules 12 and 56, preempt
state law dismissal laws under traditional federal preemption
principles?56 We contend they do. The Fifth and Eleventh
48

Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
50
Id.
51
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Clifford v. Trump, 818 F. App’x
746 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-602).
52
Id. at i.
53
Clifford v. Trump, No. 18-56351, 2021 WL 666398 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2021).
54
United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) (“The denial of a writ of
certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.”).
55
559 U.S. 393 (2010).
56
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1227–28
(2016) (hereinafter Sherry I) (urging use of revised Erie doctrine based on implied
preemption that would determine whether there was a sufficiently strong federal
interest in applying a Federal Rule uniformly to warrant displacing state law);
Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the Court Can’t Fix the Erie
Doctrine, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 173, 191 (2013) (hereinafter Sherry II) (“ ‘[N]ew
49
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Circuits made that argument when rejecting anti-SLAPP laws.
But we go further: we contend that a recent Supreme Court case
makes it clear that field preemption principles apply to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When field preemption applies
in a given area, there is no room for complementary state law.
Third, for those federal courts that apply anti-SLAPP
statutes, we address the analytical framework for resolving intercircuit conflicts that arise from applying those statutes. We will
use Clifford v. Trump as a case study.57 That case presents this
complex inter-circuit problem framed this way: Two circuit
courts, one (the Ninth Circuit) has held that anti-SLAPPs apply
in federal court and the other (the Fifth Circuit) holds they do
not. If because of choice-of-law rules, the Ninth Circuit has to
consider whether to apply the very anti-SLAPP statute the Fifth
Circuit has rejected (but which Ninth Circuit precedent favors),
how should the Ninth Circuit rule and why? We suggest an
analytical framework that accounts for the role of comity.
Fourth, for those federal courts that apply anti-SLAPP
statutes, we consider whether those early dismissal procedures
apply to claims that arise under federal law. The answer to this
question, we conclude, is no. Federalism and Supremacy Clause
concerns make this a no contest.
This paper addresses these issues in this order: Part I delves
into the history and essential features of anti-SLAPP statutes,
addressing the various formulations with a focus on the
California and Texas anti-SLAPP statutes. Part II addresses the
ground rules in federal court on the applicability of state law,
focusing on the Supreme Court cases developing its Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins58 (“Erie”) jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the
Erie’ doctrine should look like implied preemption of the ‘purposes-and-objectives’
type . . . .”); Allan Erbsen, A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal Statutes,
Rules, and Common Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1101, 1120 (2020) (“Asking
whether a federal rule has priority over a conflicting state rule is equivalent to
asking whether the federal rule preempts the state rule.”); Jack B. Harrison, Erie
SLAPP Back, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1253, 1307 (2020) (“[T]he Erie problem is,
fundamentally, a question regarding federalism and preemption.”). But see William
James Seidleck, Anti-SLAPP Statutes and the Federal Rules: Why Preemption
Analysis Shows They Should Apply in Federal Diversity Suits, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
547, 559 (2018) (“Although the Court does not explicitly apply preemption
jurisprudence to questions regarding the scope of Federal Rules, its confusing array
of cases makes more sense when viewed through a preemption prism.”).
57
See Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
58
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Supreme Court’s fragmented opinion in Shady Grove and what it
adds to modern Erie jurisprudence. Part IV explores the various
interpretations of Shady Grove in the federal appellate courts in
relation to anti-SLAPP statutes. Part V critiques the Ninth
Circuit’s established (and what seems like the Tenth Circuit’s
emerging) permissive views on anti-SLAPP statutes in diversity
jurisdiction cases. Part VI considers the inter-circuit conflicts
that anti-SLAPP statutes may pose. Part VII considers whether
anti-SLAPP statutes (in the jurisdictions that apply them) should
apply to federal causes of action.
I. THE HISTORY AND ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES
A.

The First Amendment’s Petition Clause: The Wellspring of
Anti-SLAPP Statutes?

Proponents of anti-SLAPP statutes contend that these
statutes embolden this country’s strong First Amendment values
of free speech and the right to petition.59 The First Amendment,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held, immunizes from penalty the
people’s right to petition for redress, speak freely and protest
about matters of public concern.60
Specific to filing lawsuits, the Supreme Court has held that
filing a lawsuit is protected First Amendment activity.61 The

59
See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 945–48 (1992); see also generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (noting that in this country, “[i]t is a prized American
privilege to speak one’s mind.”); Bose Corp. v. Cons. Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 503–04 (1984) (freedom to speak our minds, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted,
“is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) (“The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances.”).
60
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (First Amendment immunizes
against state tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming
from offensive speech during a protest about a “matter of public concern”); see also
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269, 279–80 (to give free speech breathing room, the Court
engrafted an actual malice requirement on public officials suing for defamation).
61
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
(citations omitted) (“[T]he right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government [and t]he right of access to the courts is . . . but one aspect of the right
of petition.”).
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Court outlined the parameters of that Petition Clause immunity
in two seminal anti-trust cases: Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.62 and United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington.63 In Noerr, the Supreme
Court confronted this question: whether a complainant could
assert a Sherman Act64 conspiracy claim based on evidence
consisting only of competitors’ lawful petitioning activities before
public officials.65
In a resounding reaffirmation of First
Amendment values, the Court rejected that claim, holding that
the Petition Clause could not tolerate a claim based on lawful
petitioning activity—i.e., seeking to persuade the government to
change the law.66 To be clear, the First Amendment did not
permit the courts to become instruments for frustrating
legitimate petitioning activity.67
If there were any doubts about the scope of Noerr’s principle,
the follow-on case eliminated them. In Pennington, another antitrust case, the Supreme Court addressed whether to limit the
Noerr doctrine only to petitioning conduct that was
unaccompanied by a purpose or intent to further a conspiracy to
violate the anti-trust statutes.68 The Court rejected that narrow
reading of Noer, instead holding that “Noerr shields from the
Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose.”69 The Court has continued to
apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine mostly in the anti-trust
field.70 Later Supreme Court cases have extended petitioning
immunity to other contexts.71 The Court has also applied the
doctrine to labor and commercial disputes.72 Following the
Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts have also extended
62

365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961).
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
64
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
65
See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
66
Id. at 136, 139–40.
67
Id. at 145.
68
See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669–70.
69
Id. at 670 (emphases added).
70
See, e.g., Allied Tube & Cond. Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499
(1988); FTC v. Sup. Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424–25 (1990); City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991).
71
BE & K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (citations omitted).
72
Id.; Bill Johnson’s Rest. Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983); Cal. Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (applied to
petitioning activity that used the courts to advocate for resolution of commercial
dispute).
63
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petitioning immunity to varied legal contexts.73 But even
petitioning activity has its limits. The Supreme Court has, for
example, held that while the right to petition is protected, the
right to commit defamation with impunity is not.74 The same
holds true with litigation—the Court recognizes an exception for
sham litigation activities.75 While the First Amendment does not
permit the courts to become instruments for frustrating
legitimate petitioning activity, the Court recognizes an exception
for sham litigation activities.76 The Court applies a two-pronged
sham test: (1) the petitioning activity must be “objectively
baseless” that no reasonable litigant could realistically prevail on
those claims; and (2) the fact-finder should also find that the
subjective motivation for the challenged activity was improper.77
B. The Essential Features of Anti-SLAPP Statutes
1.

A Brief History of Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Their Core
Features

With the history of petitioning immunity outlined, we begin
our analysis of the essential features of anti-SLAPPs. Drawing
inspiration from the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the Petition
Clause, several states passed anti-SLAPP statutes—that have
summary dismissal procedures—to discourage lawsuits that
penalize legitimate petitioning activity and freedom of
expression.78 Anti-SLAPP statutes come in different stripes. The
most stringent kind, those that are the focus of this article,
generally have these four features:

73
Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367–68 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Noerr-Pennington protects concerted threats of ligation); Barq’s Inc. v. Barq’s Bev.,
Inc., 677 F. Supp. 449, 452–53 (E.D. La. 1987) (applying to prelitigation enforcement
of trademark litigation); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (NoerrPennington doctrine “applies equally in all contexts”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Maj.
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]e
do not question the application of the right to petition outside of antitrust . . . .”).
74
See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (“The right to petition is
guaranteed; the right to commit libel with impunity is not.”).
75
E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
76
Id.; see also Bill Johnson’s Rest., 461 U.S. at 743; Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 326 (2010) (“Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment.”).
77
See Pro. Real Estate Inv. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60–61 (1993).
78
See Pring et al., supra note 59, at 959–61.
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• An expedited special motion to dismiss or strike in which a
judge has power to consider conflicting evidence and
determine whether a plaintiff has met her prima facie (triallike) burden with clear evidence;79
• A blanket discovery ban during the special motion to dismiss
or strike’s pendency, unless a judge permits limited
discovery;80
• An expedited interlocutory appeal if the trial court denies the
defendant’s motion to dismiss or strike or fails to rule
within the statutory prescribed time;81 and
• Attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions if the court sustains the
defense motion to dismiss or strike.82

To trigger anti-SLAPP statutes, the movant must first show
that the plaintiff’s claim relates to her exercise of free speech,
right to petition or association. The right of free speech
encompasses communications made in connection with a matter
of public concern.83 A matter of public concern touches on
matters about public health and safety and so on.84 If a
defendant satisfies his initial burden of showing that the lawsuit
relates to protected rights, the law then looks to the plaintiff to
respond. The plaintiff must produce prima facie evidence in
support of her claims.85 Texas imposes an additional step if the
plaintiff meets her burden of producing evidence in support of
her claims: the defendant has to prove that a defense applies.86
2.

Judicial construction of the California anti-SLAPP law

Although the California and Texas anti-SLAPP statutes
share core features, they also have important differences,87 which
79

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (b)(1) (West 2021); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.003(a)–(b) (West 2021).
80
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § § 27.003(c) & 27.006(b); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16(g).
81
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.008(b).
82
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(a)(1); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16(c)(1).
83
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(3).
84
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7); CAL. CIV PROC. CODE § 425.16(e).
85
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
27.005(c).
86
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d); see also Exxon Mobil Pipeline
Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W. 3d 895, 898–99 (Tex. 2018).
87
See, e.g., Metabolic Rsch., Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“[D]eeper inspection has persuaded us that, while all of the [anti-SLAPP] statutes
have common elements, there are significant differences as well, so that each state’s
statutory scheme must be evaluated separately.”).
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can make all the difference, particularly when we consider the
judicial gloss that has been added to them. For example, unlike
Texas, California—mindful of its constitutional commitment to
the right to a jury trial on disputed factual questions—has
judicially interpreted its anti-SLAPP statute to function like an
expedited summary judgment.88
The California judicial glosses are not without their own
jurisprudential challenges, and two particular challenges come to
mind. To begin with, when read literally, the California statute
envisions that trial courts must consider conflicting evidence and
make a determination whether it meets the necessary evaluative
threshold.89 But as noted, the California Supreme Court has
interpreted the statute to prevent that outcome by judicially
creating a summary judgment-like procedure. Consider the
obvious problem with that solution: At a time when judges of all
political stripes all seem to agree that “we’re all textualists
now,”90 this atextual solution from the California Supreme Court
is itself open to scrutiny. After all, when a statute is clear, the
court’s interpretative work is done and the clear text controls.91
88

See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all . . . .”) (West, Westlaw with urgency legislation through 2021 Reg.
Sess.); Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 608 (Cal. 2016) (noting that California courts
must not weigh the evidence during an anti-SLAPP motion to strike); see also Oasis
W. Realty LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011) (California courts
should “accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff . . . and evaluate the
defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the
plaintiff” (citation omitted)). While it is true that California courts have declared
that “[a]n anti-SLAPP suit motion is not a substitute for a demurrer or summary
judgment motion,” Lam v. Ngo, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 597 n.12 (Ct. App. 2001), that
is not to say the anti-SLAPP motion, when properly triggered, does not serve the
same ends as a demurrer or summary judgment, see EHM Prod., Inc. v. Starline
Tours of Hollywood, Inc., 1 F.4th 1164, 1174–75, n.3 (9th Cir. 2021) (applying
California law).
89
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2021).
90
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2442 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (“Today it is even said that we judges are, to one degree or
another, ‘all textualists now.’ ”); see also Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are
All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
303, 304 (2017) (quoting Justice Kagan during her lecture at Harvard Law School
saying, “[W]e’re all textualists now”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING
LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (2016) (“We
are all textualists. That means that a judge must relate all sources of and arguments
about statutory interpretation to a text . . . .”).
91
Weiss v. City of Del Mar, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2019) (citations
omitted) (“If the statutory text ‘is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we
need go no further.’ ”).
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Not even the constitutional avoidance canon—when used as an
interpretative aid—can overcome the power of clear text.92 Thus,
from a textualist view, there is a plausible argument that the
California Supreme Court has abandoned its traditional
interpretative role.93
The second challenge posed by judicially revising antiSLAPP statutes stems from the practice’s potential for
unintended consequences. As noted, California has interpreted
its anti-SLAPP statute to function like summary judgment
motions of sorts. But what remains unclear is how the California
anti-SLAPP statute’s evaluative standards—“probability that the
plaintiff will prevail”—square with traditional summary
judgment standards.94 To be clear, under traditional summary
judgment standards, when there are material factual disputes,
the case warrants a trial.95 Does that rule also control in the
anti-SLAPP context?96
California has offered clarity on how its anti-SLAPP burdenshifting framework works. California courts—besides adopting
summary judgment-like standards for the California anti-SLAPP

92
See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (noting that
constitutional avoidance “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text”).
93
Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 169 P.3d 559, 567 (Cal. 2007) (“Our office . . . ‘is
simply to ascertain and declare’ what is in the relevant statutes, ‘not to insert what
has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.’ ” (alteration in original)). But
see Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he good textualist is not a literalist.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 24 (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1997) (emphasis added)).
94
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
95
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c. Although we use the phrase “traditional
summary judgment standards,” we allude only to this: material factual disputes
warrant a trial. We offer this clarification because beyond that there is little else
that is traditional about California’s summary judgment standards; in a word, they
differ from those in the federal system. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d
493, 508 (Cal. 2001) (making clear that California’s summary judgment standards
differ from those of the federal courts). For example, pointing out gaps in the nonmovant’s evidence—a theory that warrants summary judgment in federal court—
does not in California. The movant must still meet its burden with evidence showing
why it prevails before a non-movant has to respond. See id. at 510, 513; cf. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). California has a 75-day notice period for
summary judgments, something the Federal Rules do not espouse. Compare CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Beyond briefly flagging and
discussing this issue, this article does not attempt an exhaustive analysis.
96
See Todd v. Lovecruft, No. 19-cv-01751, 2020 WL 60199, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2020) (outlining concerns).
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statute—have gone one step further.97 Although the California
anti-SLAPP statute also requires initial evidence showing its
applicability,98 the burden on a plaintiff to overcome the statute’s
dismissal motion “is not high.”99 California courts do not weigh
evidence or make credibility determinations.100 The California
Supreme Court has held that the anti-SLAPP standard of review
requires a plaintiff to come forward with evidence that could
sustain a judgment for her at trial.101 The plaintiff must also, at
this rebuttal stage, overcome any affirmative defenses properly
raised and supported by defendant.102 In turn, California courts
accept as true all of plaintiff’s evidence.103 Thus, the California
anti-SLAPP framework is much like that for judgment as a
matter of law in federal court or a directed verdict in a state
court.104
3.

The Differences Between the California and Texas AntiSLAPP Statutes

While the California anti-SLAPP statute operates like a
summary judgment of sorts, the Texas statute does not. Thus,
the California and Texas anti-SLAPP statutes are not
functionally the same for two main reasons.
First, the differences begin with the burden shifting
frameworks. California’s burden shifting framework only has
two steps: (1) the defendant must show that the lawsuit relates
97

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
Wilcox v. Sup. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on
other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Cons. Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 n.5 (Cal.
2002).
99
Overstock.com v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38 (Ct. App.
2007).
100
Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454.
101
See Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002); Mindys Cosms., Inc. v.
Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying California law); id. (A
plaintiff must “state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim” (quoting Jarrow
Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 740 n.8 (Cal. 2003)).
102
Flately v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 17 (Cal. 2006). Even though the anti-SLAPP
statute “places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant
that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of
proof on the defense.” Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 44 (Ct. App. 2005).
103
Overstock.com, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38.
104
See generally Lib. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Woolman, 913 F.3d 977, 983–84 (10th
Cir. 2019) (articulating federal standards for motion for judgment as a matter of
law); accord Rinsky v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 918 F.3d 8, 26 (1st Cir. 2019);
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 640–41 (Ct. App. 2001).
98
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to protected activity—free speech or petitioning about a public
issue in a public forum; (2) then the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to establish the prima facie elements of her claim or her
probability of success on the merits.105 This burden, as noted,
requires a plaintiff to provide evidence (that if a fact-finder were
to credit) would overcome any affirmative defenses.106 The Texas
anti-SLAPP law is different. It potentially has a third step: the
first two are like California’s, but, in addition, Texas has a
contingent tiebreaker third step.107 That third step allows a
defendant to prevail if she can show that a valid defense
applies.108
Thus, even in the wake of conflicting factual
presentations (at step one and two of the burden shifting
framework), the defendant can still carry the day by simply
showing that she has a defense that applies.109 The existence of
the affirmative defense at step three allows the trial court to
become the tiebreaker. Perhaps recognizing problems with this
approach, the Texas Legislature amended its anti-SLAPP statute
in fall 2019: now, if a defendant shows (as a matter of law) that a
defense applies, then she should win.110 But it is not clear that
this amendment will be functionally better than the old one. To
be sure, when does a defendant establish a defense as a matter of
law? In the summary judgment context, for example, Texas
courts have held that a defendant does so when she has
conclusively proved all the elements of the defense, “leaving no
material questions of fact.”111 Indeed, this invites a follow-up
inquiry: If there is a conflicting evidentiary presentation from the
plaintiff at step two of the burden shifting framework, then
logically—unless a defendant accepts the plaintiff’s version of
facts or attacks the admissibility of the evidence in support—it is
hard to imagine a defendant satisfying his defense with no
material factual questions at issue. So, it seems that, despite the
105
106
107
108
109

See Flatley, 139 P.3d at 11.
See id.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d) (West 2022).
Id.
See Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W. 3d 895, 898–99 (Tex.

2018).
110
Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d) (West 2022), with
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c) (West 2013).
111
See, e.g., Garza v. Williams Bros. Const. Co., 879 S.W. 2d 290, 294 (Tex. App.
1994) (“When a defendant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense,
he has the burden to conclusively prove all the essential elements of
its defense as a matter of law, leaving no issues of material fact.” (emphasis added)).
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amendment, Texas judges might still have to resolve disputed
material questions of fact.
California’s approach at the last step—where courts consider
a plaintiff’s evidence—is remarkably different.
Under
California’s anti-SLAPP burden-shifting framework, the courts
accept the plaintiff’s evidence at the second step of the analysis
as true.112 Neither the Texas anti-SLAPP statute nor Texas case
law, however, offer a similar presumption to a plaintiff. When a
California court compares the plaintiff’s evidence at step two
with the defendant’s initial evidence at step one, the court will
deny anti-SLAPP motions if it determines that a jury could
render a verdict for the plaintiff—if it credited her evidence.113 In
that sense, the burden at step two is the same as that of a nonmovant in a summary judgment—that is, to show material
factual disputes.114
Second, the quantum of evidence required from a plaintiff
under the Texas and California anti-SLAPP statutes is different.
Under the California statute, a plaintiff’s burden “is not high.”115
Courts have held that the California statute only requires a
“minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.”116 This is a
contrast to the Texas anti-SLAPP statute. Under the Texas antiSLAPP statute, at step two of the analysis, plaintiff must adduce
“clear and specific evidence” in support of her case.117 The
Supreme Court of Texas has interpreted this to mean that, at
this stage, the burden on plaintiff is no greater than what she
must meet at trial.118 Thus, in California the plaintiff faces a
summary judgment like standard, while in Texas she faces a
trial-like burden at the pretrial stages, without the benefits of
discovery.119
112

Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2002).
Wilcox v. Sup. Ct., 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 819 (App. Ct. 1994).
114
Navellier v. Sletten, 106 Cal. App. 4th 763, 768 (App. Ct. 2003) (“[P]laintiffs’
burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment.”).
115
Overstock.com v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 688, 699 (App.
Ct. 2007).
116
Mindys Cosms., Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted) (applying California law).
117
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §27.005(c) (West 2022).
118
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015).
119
Compare ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1010 (App.
Ct. 2001) with In re Lipsky, 460 S.W. 3d at 591. The scope of the commercial
transaction exemption is also different between the two statutes. See NCDR, L.L.C.
113
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II. THE GROUND RULES IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION CASES
A.

The Erie Rule and Its Landmark Supreme Court Refinements

The great rule every law student eventually learns in law
school is that in diversity jurisdiction cases, a federal court
applies state substantive law and federal procedural rules.120
That is the Erie rule.121 But that simple rule has, over time,
fostered confusion and a steady stream of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent seeking to clarify its parameters.
The Supreme Court did not pull the Erie rule out of thin air.
Rather, the Court was merely following congressional statutory
dictates. To be clear, the Rules Enabling Act—the statutory
source of the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority—only
authorizes it to promulgate “rules of practice and procedure”
applicable in federal courts.122 Congress imposed an important
limitation on the Court’s rulemaking power: those rules should
“not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”123 The
reason for the substantive law limitation is that in that area,
federalism concerns come into play.124
Indeed, under
longstanding federalism principles, when matters of state
substantive law are at issue, state interests take precedence
unless unique federal interests need vindication.125 To that end,
in the Rules of Decision Act,126 Congress instructed federal courts
to apply the “laws of the several states” in cases other than

v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 754–55 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying Texas
law) (discussing differences between California and Texas’ commercial exemptions).
120
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
121
Id. The Supreme Court has also held that there is no general federal common
law. Id. Still, the Court has, in recent times, tempered this holding: most recently,
the Court confirmed there still exist “limited areas . . . in which federal [courts] may
appropriately craft the rule of decision.” Rodriguez v. F.D.I.C., 140 S. Ct. 713, 717
(2020). The rule of decision in those federal common law cases, federal courts have
held, are a form of “statutory interpretation” that looks to “congressional silence” in
codified text as license to develop rules to protect “uniquely federal interests.”
Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959, 965 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019).
122
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (West 2022).
123
Id. § 2072(b).
124
Arthur Miller, § 4509 The Erie Doctrine, Rules Enabling Act, and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure—The “Substantive Rights” Limitation, in FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, eds., 3d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated 2021).
125
See id.
126
28 U.S.C. § 1652.
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federal question jurisdiction cases.127 That, in turn, makes the
dichotomy between substantive and procedural law all the more
important. How should federal courts tell them apart?
The first important Supreme Court case to attempt to
address that question was a 1941 case, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.128
Sibbach was a humdrum personal injury action in which the
defendant moved the federal court to order plaintiff to submit to
a medical examination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 35. After plaintiff
ignored the order for medical examination, the federal court held
plaintiff in contempt and imposed sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
37.129 Plaintiff appealed.130 The question presented was whether
Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 and 37 were valid exercises of the Supreme
Court’s rulemaking power within the limits of the Rules
Enabling Act.131 That statute, recall, limits the Supreme Court’s
rulemaking powers to rules of procedure.132 The Court held that
the rules were valid procedural rules.133 The Court held so
because procedural rules regulate “the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.”134 But the question remained: which laws
only regulate the procedure for vindicating the remedy?
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed that
question in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.135 In that case, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether a diversity jurisdiction
equity lawsuit was subject to a state’s statute of limitations for
similar suits under the common law.136 The federal court of
appeals had declined to apply the state law limitations period,
but the Supreme Court ultimately reversed.137 The Court
introduced into the legal lexicon the outcome determination
test—that is, whether a given state law affected the result of
litigation so that if a federal court ignored it, the outcome would

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id.
312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941).
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
Id.
326 U.S. 99, 99–100 (1945).
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 109–12.
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be different to that in state court for the same case.138 If the
outcome would change, then a federal court had to apply the
state law.139
The next important case was Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Coop.140 That case significantly tempered Guaranty
Trust’s outcome determination test,141 especially when there are
countervailing federal interests at stake.142
In Byrd, the
Supreme Court held that in the Erie context, federal courts
should not apply state law that conflicts with overriding federal
interests, such as the right to trial by jury for disputed factual
questions.143 Byrd presented a question about the appropriate
factfinder in a diversity jurisdiction personal injury action.144
South Carolina law at the time required that a judge, not a jury,
determine whether a defendant’s affirmative defense of worker’s
compensation immunity applied, even in the wake of disputed
factual questions.145 The appellate court endorsed the state law’s
approach, but the Supreme Court reversed.146
The Court
reasoned that despite South Carolina’s important policy goals for
switching the factfinder from jury to judge on that question,
those considerations had to yield to the Seventh Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution’s assignment of disputed factual questions
to a jury.147 In short, Byrd held that the outcome determination
test must yield when important federal interests are at stake.148
The Supreme Court reined in the outcome determination test
even more in Hanna v. Plumer.149 In Hanna, a personal injury
case that raised a conflict between federal and state service of
process rules, the Supreme Court held that Erie doctrine was
inapplicable to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.150 The

138

Id. at 109.
Id. at 109–10.
140
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
141
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
142
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536–38.
143
Id. at 535.
144
Id. at 527–28.
145
Id. at 531.
146
Id. at 530–31.
147
Id. at 537–38.
148
Id. at 538–40.
149
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
150
Id. at 469–70 (“Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins [does not] constitute[ ] the
appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule.”).
139
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Court clarified that federal courts should not mechanically apply
the “[o]utcome-determination” test to conflicts between state law
and federal procedural rules;151 instead, courts should be guided
by “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.”152 Even then, the Court was quick to point out that when
a federal rule speaks to the issue at hand, and there is “direct
collision” between federal rules and state law,153 a federal court
need not wade into the “relatively unguided Erie [c]hoice.”154 The
federal court must apply the federal rule unless the rule is
invalid.155
B. The Honorable Mentions: The Erie Supreme Court Cases We
Should Never Overlook
Simple rules are not always easy to apply. The Erie rule—
with its federal procedural rules and state substantive law
monikers—has proven that. Besides the landmark Supreme
Court cases highlighted supra, the Court has decided other lesser
known, but no less worthy, cases on the Erie rule. We highlight
those cases below.
The first case is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.156 That case
considered whether, in a diversity jurisdiction case, an action is
“commenced” for purposes of a state statute of limitations when
the plaintiff filed the complaint or served the defendant with
process, as the applicable state law required.157 There, the Court
distinguished Hanna, a case that found “a ‘direct collision’
between” a state law’s requirement of “in-hand service” of process
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), which authorized substituted service
of process at the defendant’s residence.158 Hanna held that state
law had to yield.159 In Walker, in contrast, the Court found no
direct collision between Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 and Oklahoma law.160
Rule 3 provided that a party commenced a civil action “by filing a
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 466.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 471.
Id.
See generally 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
Id. at 742–43.
Id. at 749.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 752.
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complaint with the court.”161
On the other hand, under
Oklahoma law, a party commenced an action only when she filed
a complaint within the limitations period and served a defendant
within sixty days.162
The Supreme Court, applying the plain meaning of Rule 3,
held that it was not as a broad as the losing party contended.163
The Court found no textual support for Rule 3 tolling a state
statute of limitations or displacing state law.164 Instead, the
Court found that Rule 3 and the state law targeted different
concerns: Rule 3 governed when the “timing requirements” of the
Rules of Civil Procedure began, but not the running of state
statutes of limitations.165 State law instead addressed when the
statute of limitations ran and stopped.166 Thus, the Court held—
while injecting a new dimension into its evolving Erie
jurisprudence—that when a federal and state procedural rule
could co-exist, there was no direct conflict, and that state law
applied.167
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,168 the next
notable Erie decision, went in the opposite direction. The Court
found a direct conflict between a Federal Rule and a state
statute.169 In Woods, after affirming a judgment for the plaintiffs
in a diversity personal injury action, the Eleventh Circuit
imposed a 10% penalty on the defendant based on an Alabama
statute.170 That statute mandated a categorical 10% penalty
whenever an appellate court affirmed a judgment that the courts
had stayed after the posting of a supersedeas bond.171 The
161

See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 742–43.
163
Id. at 750, 750 n.9 (rejecting any suggestion “that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state
law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with
state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v.
Plumer applies.” (emphases added)).
164
Id. at 750–51.
165
Id. at 751.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 752–53.
168
480 U.S. 1 (1987).
169
Id. at 7.
170
See id. at 3.
171
As relevant, the Alabama statute provided:
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether
debt or damages, and the same has been stayed on appeal by the
execution of bond, with surety, if the appellate court affirms the
162
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Supreme Court reversed because Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38172 controlled, and it allowed an appellate court to
award damages only if it determined, in its discretion, that the
appeal was frivolous.173 In other words, the conflict was that the
federal rule applied a “case-by-case approach,” while the
Alabama statute imposed a categorical 10% penalty on all
frivolous appeals.174
The Court found that the state rule
hindered Fed. R. App. P. 38 because it “preclude[d the] exercise
of discretion within [the] scope of [its] operation.”175
Citing Walker v. Armco Steel, the Supreme Court outlined a
clear framework for addressing Erie questions.176 The framework
was this:
The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed,
the scope of Federal Rule 38 is “sufficiently broad” to cause a
“direct collision” with the state law or, implicitly, to “control the
issue” before the court, thereby leaving no room for the
operation of that law. . . . The Rule must then be applied if it
represents a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking authority,
which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on
this Court by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.177

Reiterating its key Erie principles and its holding in Hanna, the
Court made it clear that “[r]ules regulating matters indisputably
procedural are a priori constitutional.”178 That is because the
Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Court to promulgate “rules of
practice and procedure” applicable in federal courts.179
But what of rules that fall within the uncertain boundary
between procedure and substance? After all, as noted, in the
Rules Enabling Act, Congress imposed an important limitation
judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment against all or
any of the obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed
judgment, 10 percent damages thereon and the costs of the appellate
court . . . .
Woods, 480 U.S. at 3 (citing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986)).
172
FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides: “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal
is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee.”
173
Woods, 480 U.S. at 4, 7.
174
Id. at 8.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 4–5.
177
Id. (citations omitted).
178
Id. at 5.
179
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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on the Supreme Court’s rulemaking power: those rules should
“not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”180 Woods
had an answer to that question. The Court held that federal
rules that regulate matters that fall “within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure” and that can be classed as
either are constitutional and valid.181
The Court reached that conclusion for two reasons. First,
the Court made clear that federal rules that only incidentally
affect substantive rights are valid because they comply with its
congressionally granted rulemaking authority.182 Congress
authorized the Court to promulgate uniform rules for practice
and procedure in the federal courts that are “necessary to
maintain the integrity of that system.”183 Thus, if “necessary”
federal procedural rules only incidentally affect substantive
rights, they are still valid because they honor the congressional
grant of rulemaking authority.184 In the same vein, the Supreme
Court also determined that Rule 38 was within the permissible
scope of its congressional rulemaking authority because as a
procedural rule, it only affected the process of enforcing the rights
of parties, rather than the rights themselves.185 Second, the
multiple layers of review—by the Advisory Committee, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court
itself, and Congress—together clothe the rules with a
presumption of constitutional and enacting validity.186
In the next notable case, the Supreme Court found no direct
conflict between a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and state law.
That case was Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.187
Gasperini involved a New York statute that empowered state
appellate courts to reexamine, in the first instance, jury verdicts
for excessiveness.188 This standard differs from what happens in
federal courts, where trial (rather than appellate) courts review
verdicts for excessiveness and may order new trials if the verdict

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. § 2072(b).
Woods, 480 U.S. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
Id. at 418.
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is against the weight of the evidence.189 The Supreme Court,
however, found no direct collision between the state rule and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Rule 59 does not specify
a particular standard for reviewing jury verdicts.190 Thus, the
Court held, the New York statute should be applied in diversity
jurisdiction cases in the federal courts to avoid differences in
outcome between the state and federal courts.191
Gasperini is also notable for three other reasons. First, in
seeking to distinguish between state procedural and substantive
laws, the Court held that laws that reassign decision-making
authority from one body to another (in that case a trial court to
an appellate court) are procedural.192 Thus, under longstanding
Erie principles, that procedural element of the New York law had
to yield. Although the Court acknowledged that its Guaranty
Trust outcome determination test often required that federal
courts apply state law to prevent a disparity of outcomes between
the two forums, the Court reiterated its holding in Byrd.193 In
Byrd, the Supreme Court held that the outcome determination
test was not controlling in the wake of countervailing federal
interests.194
The countervailing federal interests in Gasperini came
courtesy of the U.S. Constitution’s Seventh Amendment
Reexamination Clause.195
That clause prevents the
reexamination of jury verdicts except in line with longstanding
common law standards for granting new trials.196 Because New
York law would have required the appellate court to usurp the
trial court’s role in examining excessive verdicts, to become a
court of first view (not review),197 that framework conflicted with

189

Id. at 433.
Id. at 435–36.
191
Id. at 430–31.
192
Id. at 426.
193
See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431–32.
194
Id.
195
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” (emphases added)).
196
Id.
197
See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct.
2051, 2056 (2019) (“As we have said many times before, we are a court of ‘review,’
not of ‘first view.’ ”).
190
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the Seventh Amendment.198 For that reason, the Court held,
federal trial courts should apply the material deviation standard
in reviewing verdicts for excessiveness in the first instance,
subject to appellate court review for abuse of discretion.199
Gasperini is also notable for a second reason. The case
highlights how a given state law may have both substantive and
procedural elements, and if so, the federal courts might follow
state law for the substantive aspects and federal law for the
procedural aspects.200 This point, however, should not be read
out of context untethered from the Court’s other rulings on laws
that have both procedural and substantive elements. To that
end, the reader should recall, for example, the Court’s ruling in
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods.201 In that case, the
Court made clear that a federal procedural rule that has both
procedural and substantive elements is valid and should control
(over a contrary state law) in federal court.202 That outcome
generally holds true, however, under either of two circumstances:
(1) if the state law directly conflicts with the text or mode of
operation of a federal rule; or (2) there is a countervailing federal
interest that requires vindication, so the federal court must
temper a contrary state law.203
Third, Gasperini is also notable because it represented the
resurgence of the Erie outcome determination test. That test
made its way into Erie lexicon in Guaranty Trust.204 But, as
noted, a series of Supreme Court cases beginning with Hanna
tempered the outcome determination test, preferring instead to
probe Erie requirements through the prism of the collision test.205
And Byrd also added the primacy of the countervailing federal
interest.206 But as the dissenting opinions in Gasperini made
clear, a majority of the Court appeared to return the law to a
time when the outcome determination test was the sole
controlling criterion.207
198

Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 434–36.
Id. at 438.
200
Id. at 435–38.
201
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1987).
202
Id. at 4–7.
203
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535–38 (1958); see also
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435–38.
204
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–12 (1945).
205
See Hanna v. Plummer , 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965).
206
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537–38.
207
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court then interpreted Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) narrowly in Semtek International, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.208 But was the Court overruling Walker
and Burlington sub silencio by interpreting a federal rule
narrowly? Recall, Walker and Burlington both rejected the idea
that a federal court should interpret a federal rule narrowly;
instead, the Court has held that federal courts should give the
rules their ordinary meaning.209 At first glance it would appear
that the Court was in fact sanctioning a categorical approach of
interpreting federal rules narrowly.210 But on deeper inspection,
it was not. In later cases, the Court explained that it never
sanctioned a categorical rule that federal courts should interpret
the federal rules narrowly.211 Rather, the Court only interpreted
federal rules narrowly in Semtek, Walker (and other similar
cases) because the rule at issue was ambiguous—i.e., susceptible
to more than one meaning.212
With that clarification, we more fully unpack Semtek. The
case arose out of an involuntary dismissal of a diversity action in
a federal court in California because California’s two-year statute
of limitations barred the claim.213 After the dismissal and hoping
to get around the statute of limitations issue, the plaintiff refiled
the same action in a federal court in Maryland to benefit from
Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations.214 The issue was
whether Rule 41(b) precluded this new filing in Maryland.215
Although Rule 41(b) states that unless the trial court orders

208

531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001).
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (rejecting any
suggestion “that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in
order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules should be given
their plain meaning.” (emphases added)); see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods,
480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (explaining that a federal court should “fairly construe[ ]” a
federal rule).
210
In fairness to the reader, that would probably have been a plausible reading
of Semtek, as just three years before, the Court had read other federal rules
narrowly. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842, 845 (1999) (applying
“limiting construction” to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to avoid “potential conflict with the
Rules Enabling Act”); accord Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13
(1997).
211
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 405–06 &
n.7 (2010).
212
Id.
213
Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499–500 (2001).
214
Id.
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Id. at 500–01.
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otherwise, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication
upon the merits,” the Supreme Court read Rule 41(b) narrowly.216
The Court held that Rule 41(b) only barred plaintiff from refiling
the case in the original California federal court, but it did not bar
refiling in another state with a longer statute of limitations, such
as Maryland.217
The twin aims of the Erie doctrine—discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws—greatly influenced the Court’s decision.218 To be clear,
the Supreme Court reasoned that if California’s substantive law
of claim preclusion permitted the refiling of an action in other
jurisdictions after a dismissal, on statute of limitations grounds,
in a California court, then a federal court sitting in diversity
should follow suit.219 Otherwise, for a federal court to reach a
different outcome than California’s state courts on this purely
state law issue would violate the Erie doctrine’s federalism
principles.220 In other words, for a federal court to bar a claim
that state law allowed could be an interference with substantive
state law rights, which the Rules Enabling Act forbids.221
Thus, the Court ruled that interpreting Rule 41(b) narrowly
was necessary to avoid affecting the plaintiff’s substantive
rights.222 In passing, the Court also made clear that “federal
common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by
a federal court sitting in diversity.”223
But in diversity
jurisdiction actions, with no overriding federal interests at issue,
forum state law should determine the claim preclusive effect of a
Rule 41(b) dismissal.224
Together, these Supreme Court Erie decisions represent the
amalgamation of decades long evolving judicial philosophy on the
proper balance of competing federal and state legal interests.
The federal courts—in diversity jurisdiction cases—have served
216

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501–02.
Id. at 506.
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Id. at 508–09.
219
Id. at 504.
220
Id.
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Id. at 503–04 (“[I]f California law left petitioner free to sue on this claim in
Maryland even after the California statute of limitations had expired, the federal
court’s extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41(b)’s mandated claimpreclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to violate [the Rules Enabling Act].”).
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Id. at 503.
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Id. at 508.
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Id. at 509.
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as the test lab for these evolving judicial philosophies. From
Justice Brandeis’ groundbreaking Erie decision225 itself to Justice
Frankfurter’s outcome determination test in Guaranty Trust226
and Chief Justice Warren’s Hanna direct collision test,227 the Erie
doctrine has evolved time and again. To that list add Byrd,
which added a federal dimension to the traditionally state-law
laser-focused Erie analysis: if state law interferes with a
countervailing federal interest, like the Seventh Amendment, it
must yield.228 By the time Justice Marshall added his two
unanimous opinions in Walker and Woods in the 1980s, the Erie
test had evolved even further, leading some to suggest that it
could accommodate parallel state law, so long as it could co-exist
with a federal rule, without affecting its area of operation.229
In short, leading into the spring of 2010, the process for
determining whether to apply state or federal law was
straightforward. If there was a direct collision between a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure and a state law, the Federal Rule would
govern as long as it was valid.230 On the other hand, if there was
no direct collision, the state law would govern,231 as long as there
were no overriding federal interests that precluded application of
state law.232 But if no federal rule or statute specifically
governed the issue, then the Erie doctrine required federal courts
to apply state law if to refuse to do so would invite forumshopping and create disparate litigation outcomes in federal and
state court.233
Things, however, were about to change
dramatically during the 2009 Supreme Court Term.
225

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–12 (1945).
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Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–70 (1965).
228
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. 356 U.S. 525, 535–38 (1958).
229
We highlight this co-existence test injected in the Erie framework by Walker
and Woods because, as we later show, some federal appellate courts have relied on
those decisions to hold that state anti-SLAPP statutes can co-exist alongside parallel
federal procedural law. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles
& Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Godin v. Schenks, 629
F.3d 79, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2010).
230
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–8 (1987); Hanna, 380 U.S.
at 467–70.
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Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–51 (1980).
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See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)
(referring to the federal common law); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 435, 437–48 (1996) (Seventh Amendment reexamination clause); Byrd, 356 U.S.
at 537–39 (Seventh Amendment preservation clause).
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See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468; Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428.
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III. SHADY GROVE : AN ERIE TURNING POINT
During the 2009 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,234 a
seminal case on the Erie rule. Shady Grove produced a majority
opinion, a plurality, a separate concurrence and a “dissenting
opinion.” We address each.
A.

Majority Opinion

In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court addressed a conflict
between Fed. R. Civ. P. 23’s permissive class action framework
and New York’s more restrictive parallel state law.235 New York
state law precluded class actions for cases that only sought
penalties or statutory minimum damages.236 But under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23, a federal court could entertain and certify those kinds
of lawsuits.237 The question presented was whether, in a
diversity jurisdiction case, a federal court should have applied
the restrictive state law or Fed. R. Civ. P. 23’s permissive class
action rules.238 To answer the question presented, the Supreme
Court outlined a two-pronged test: A federal rule governs when it
(1) “answer[s] the same question” as the state law, and (2) it is
not “ultra vires.”239 Applying that test, the Court held that the
state law was inapplicable in diversity cases.240 On the first
prong of its test, the Court held that the state law and Rule 23
answered the same question: under what circumstances may “a
class action . . . proceed for a given suit.”241 But on the second
prong—whether Rule 23 was ultra vires—the Court had no
majority.
B. Plurality Opinion
On the second prong of its analysis focusing on the validity of
Rule 23, a Justice Scalia-led-plurality held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
was valid.242 Focusing on the command of the Rules Enabling
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

559 U.S. 393 (2010).
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399–401.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 399–400.
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Act, the plurality outlined that Congress has undoubted power to
supplant state law and prescribe housekeeping rules for the
federal courts.243 As long as those prescribed rules rationally fall
within the classification of “procedure,” under longstanding
precedent, those rules are valid.244 That is why, the plurality
reasoned, that the Court had rejected every challenge to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.245 The plurality was fixated
with the particular label (whether procedural or substantive)
that a given state law had; after all, the Rules Enabling Act—the
overarching consideration in that analysis—focused on whether
the federal rule was procedural or substantive.246 In other words,
the validity of a federal rule depends on whether it really
regulates procedure.247
Based on that understanding, the
plurality reasoned that Rule 23 was merely a claim processing
rule that did not abridge or alter substantive rights.248 As a
result, under longstanding Supreme Court precedents, Rule 23
was within the province of the Rules Enabling Act. Thus, it was
valid.249
C. Justice Stevens’ Partial Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens concurred only to the judgment on this
second issue: whether Rule 23 was ultra vires.250 Although
Justice Stevens also eventually agreed that Rule 23 was not ultra
vires, he did so for different reasons.251 Contrary to the plurality
that focused on whether Rule 23 was procedural, Justice Stevens
instead focused on whether the state law it displaced was really
procedural.252 Like the plurality, Justice Stevens also was wary
of labels.253 To him, however, the label alone was not the sole
controlling criterion. Instead, if a so-called procedural law was
“so bound up with” or “intertwined with” a state law remedy, so
that it defines the scope of that remedy, then federal courts are
243
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406–07
(2010) (plurality opinion, Part B).
244
Id. at 406.
245
Id. at 406–08.
246
Id. at 410–12.
247
Id. at 406–07 (plurality opinion, Part B).
248
Id. at 408.
249
Id. at 409–10.
250
Id. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
251
Id. at 426–27.
252
Id. at 431–32.
253
Id. at 424–26.
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not free to ignore such a state rule.254 The challenge, however,
and even Justice Stevens acknowledged, was to come up with a
functional test that would distinguish between those procedural
rules that merely regulated procedure and those that also
affected the remedy.255
To this concern, Justice Stevens’ opinion tried to formulate a
workable test. To begin with, Justice Stevens contended that,
under his test, “the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a
high one.”256 Applying that high bar in Shady Grove, Justice
Stevens concluded that Rule 23 was valid because the state law
at issue was a procedural law in the ordinary sense.257 According
to Justice Stevens, the law was procedural because it was not a
part of state remedies and applied “to claims based on federal
law or the law of any other State.”258 Thus understood, Justice
Stevens contended, it was hard to imagine that state law being
one that “defin[ed] New York’s rights or remedies.”259 The
converse of that reasoning being that if a state law was limited in
its application to specific claims (rather than any claim
generally), then under Justice Stevens’ test, it is perhaps part of
that specific claim or right.260
D. Justice Ginsburg’s “Dissenting” Opinion261
Together with three other justices, Justice Ginsburg
dissented in Shady Grove. From her perspective, the Court had
254

Id. at 420–23, 429.
Id. at 433–34. On this score, the plurality strongly disagreed with Justice
Stevens. In the plurality’s view, most (if not all) rules that govern procedure also
affect the remedy. See id. at 412 n.10 (plurality opinion). In the end, the plurality
was concerned that the concurrence’s test would allow state law to add varied
glosses on the federal rules (depending on the geographical source of the rule) simply
because the state procedural rule was intertwined with a remedy or state right. Id.
at 413 n.11.
256
Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 432.
260
See id.
261
We have placed Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in quotations because,
as we later show, at least five justices joined portions of her opinion, arguably
making it a majority on some issues. Id. at 421 n.5; see e.g., Borden v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 1817, 1829 n.6 (2021) (plurality opinion) (aggregating four-justice
plurality together with separate concurrence to achieve five-justice majority for
reversal); id. at 1838 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (engaging in similar vote
aggregating exercise). We address Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion more fully
later in this section.
255
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radically departed from its previous course where it interpreted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with “sensitivity
to . . . important state regulatory policies.”262 On this point,
Justice Stevens partially agreed with Justice Ginsburg and the
three other justices—also making a five-vote majority.263 Begin
with the obvious: under what circumstances should a federal
court read a federal rule narrowly? Justice Stevens, agreeing
with Justice Ginsburg and three other justices to form a
majority, stated that a federal court should avoid reading a
federal rule broadly—but with sensitivity to state interests—”if
the text permits.”264 But when does a text permit? Justice
Stevens disagreed with Justice Ginsburg that federal courts
should “contort[ ]” federal rules, as a matter of course, “absent
congressional authorization to do so, to accommodate state policy
goals.”265 So not as a matter of course. But when? Look again at
the Justice Scalia-authored majority opinion, where Justice
Stevens supplied the fifth (majority) vote. The answer is that a
federal court should read a federal rule “with sensitivity to
important state interests” only when dealing with “an ambiguous
Federal Rule to avoid ‘substantial variations [in outcomes]
between state and federal litigation.’ ”266
In sum, absent ambiguity in a federal rule or specific
congressional authorization, a federal court should not contort a
clear federal rule, as a matter of course.267 Thus, in suggesting a
categorical rule of always contorting a federal rule to
accommodate important state interests, Justice Ginsburg wrote
for the dissenters.268

262

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.; see id. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
264
Id. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
266
Id. at 405 n.7 (emphasis added) (quoting id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting));
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001).
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See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 405 n.7.; see also id. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 431 (“Simply because a rule
should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts may
rewrite the rule.”).
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Based on her dissenting view that federal courts should read
federal rules narrowly to accommodate important state interests,
Justice Ginsberg contended that Rule 23 and state law did not
conflict.269 To put it differently, even if a clear federal rule
controlled an issue, Justice Ginsburg would have read the federal
rule narrowly to accommodate state law.270 Based on that
understanding, Justice Ginsburg contended that Rule 23 laid out
standards for “enforcing a claim for relief,” while, in contrast,
state law merely defined the “dimensions of the claim itself.”271
Thus, the two laws targeted different inquiries and could coexist.272 Justice Ginsburg then applied the traditional Erie
considerations that seek to guard against dissonance of outcomes
in federal and state courts and proscribe forum-shopping.273
Justice Ginsburg rejected the petitioner’s characterization of
the state law as merely procedural.274 In her view, the New York
law was the functional equivalent of state damage limitation
law.275 Under longstanding Erie precedents, damage-limiting
aspects of state law apply in diversity jurisdiction cases.276
IV. DIFFERENT SHADES OF GROVE: SHADY GROVE IN THE VARIED
CIRCUITS
Most courts that have considered Shady Grove agree that it
was a seminal case in the development of the Erie doctrine.277
But those courts cannot seem to agree on is what exactly Shady
Grove changed.278 Below, we consider how the federal courts of
appeals have interpreted Shady Grove and how they have
applied it especially in relation to anti-SLAPP statutes.
269

Id. at 446–47.
See id. at 438–43.
271
Id. at 447.
272
See id. at 447–50.
273
See id. at 452–53.
274
See id. at 456–57.
275
See id. at 457.
276
See id. at 456–58.
277
See generally id. at 397–406; id. at 442–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that Shady Grove had departed from longstanding Erie precedents). See also, e.g.,
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw &
Callahan, JJ., concurring) (Shady Grove “framed the ‘direct collision’ inquiry in a
new way” (emphasis added)).
278
See Sydney Buckley, Getting SLAPP Happy: Why the U.S. District Court for
the District of Kansas Should Adopt the Ninth Circuit’s Approach When Applying
Kansas Anti-SLAPP Law, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 803–04 (2020); see also Harrison,
supra note 12, at 1279–80.
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A.

The D.C. Circuit, Followed by the Second, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits All Read Shady Grove to Preclude Most
Anti-SLAPP Statutes

Then-Judge Kavanaugh led the way unpacking Shady
Grove’s full implications on anti-SLAPP statutes in Abbas v.
Foreign Policy Group.279 In Abbas, the D.C. Circuit confronted
the District of Columbia’s version of an anti-SLAPP statute in a
defamation lawsuit.280 Like many statutes highlighted thus far,
the D.C. anti-SLAPP law also provided an early motion to
dismiss evaluated based on a trial-like standard, withheld
discovery from plaintiff, provided for an immediate appeal if the
court denied the dismissal motion, and awarded a prevailing
defendant attorney’s fees and costs.281 The question for the D.C.
Circuit was whether this state statute—as written—conflicted
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56.282
The D.C. Circuit concluded that under the majority opinion
in Shady Grove, the state anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable in
federal court.283 The appellate court noted first that Shady Grove
had reframed the Erie analysis: a federal court should disregard
a state procedural law if it (1) “answer[s] the same question” as a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure; and (2) the federal rule is not
ultra vires of the Rules Enabling Act.284 To determine whether
the two laws answered the same question, the D.C. Circuit
construed Federal Rules 12 and 56 as setting standards for when
a federal court “must dismiss a case before trial.”285 The critical
point for the appellate court was that the D.C. anti-SLAPP
statute imposed a likelihood of success standard, different from
Rule 12’s lesser requirement for a plaintiff to plead plausible
facts and Rule 56’s disputed material factual questions
standards.286 Under either federal rule, a plaintiff who satisfied

279

Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Id.
281
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2001) (providing for special motion to
dismiss); id § 16-5502(c) (discovery stayed during pendency of special motion to
dismiss); id. § 16-5504(a) (costs of litigation including attorney’s fees for prevailing
party).
282
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333–35.
283
Id. at 1334.
284
Id. at 1333 (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.
v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 (2010)).
285
Id. at 1333–34.
286
Id.
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those minimal standards could proceed to a trial.287 Not so with
the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus the anti-SLAPP statute was
inapplicable.288
Because the anti-SLAPP statute was
inapplicable, so were its attendant attorney’s fees, costs, and
sanctions provisions.289
Taking its cue from the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit
held in Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., that Shady Grove
precludes Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal court.290 In
Carbone, another defamation case, the Eleventh Circuit had to
consider whether Georgia’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike could
apply in a diversity jurisdiction case.291 The Plaintiff sued CNN
claiming that it had published defamatory stories against him.292
In response, CNN moved to strike the complaint under the
Georgia anti-SLAPP statute and, alternatively, to dismiss it
based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).293 The district court denied the
state anti-SLAPP motion, holding that it conflicted with Rule
12(b)(6).294 The court then denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
because the complaint was factually sufficient.295 CNN filed an
interlocutory appeal relying on the state anti-SLAPP statute.296
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.297 The appellate court held that
the Georgia anti-SLAPP motion to strike conflicted with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8, 12, and 56. 298 Applying Shady Grove, the Eleventh
Circuit held that, between them, Rule 8, 12, and 56 set out the
terms under which a federal court should dismiss a case
pretrial.299 Because the anti-SLAPP statute sought to answer the
same question as Rules 12 and 56—i.e., when a federal court
should dismiss a case pretrial—it conflicted with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.300 The Eleventh Circuit also held that
the anti-SLAPP statute’s evaluative standards conflicted with
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1337 n.5.
Carbone v. Cable News Network, 910 F.3d 1345, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1349–50.
Id. at 1351–53.
Id. at 1350.
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those of the federal rules.301 To be clear, the combined effect of
Rule 8 and 12(b)(6) is that a federal court should not dismiss a
complaint when it states plausible facts.302 But with the antiSLAPP statute, allegations alone are not enough to avoid
dismissal: the non-movant must establish a trial-like standard
prima facie case at the pleading stage, without discovery.303
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also found that the anti-SLAPP
statute was not like a traditional Rule 56 summary judgment.
Under a traditional Rule 56 summary judgment, the existence of
disputed factual questions on favorable law is enough to secure a
trial.304 Not with the anti-SLAPP statute—the existence of
disputed factual questions is the beginning and not the end of the
analysis, and only evidence of a prima facie case will suffice.305
The Eleventh Circuit found this framework incompatible with
the federal rules.306
Applying the Shady Grove majority framework, the Fifth
Circuit also held in Klocke v. Watson that the TCPA—the Texas
anti-SLAPP statute—was inapplicable in federal court.307 Like
the D.C. Circuit and Eleventh Circuit before it, the Fifth Circuit
also applied the Shady Grove majority framework—i.e., does the
state law answer the same question as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure?308 Adding its own spin to the test, the Fifth Circuit
framed the issue this way: Does the TCPA answer the same
question as the federal rules, that is, does it also lay out when a
federal court should dismiss a case pretrial?309 The Fifth Circuit
held that the two laws answered the same question of when a
federal court should dismiss a case pretrial.310 With the benefit
of that answer, the appellate court then considered whether the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 were valid exercises
of delegated congressional power.311

301
302
303
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306
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308
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350–51.
Id. at 1351–52.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1351–52.
936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 244–49.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 247–48.
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The Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the validity of those
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.312
First, it applied the
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods presumption of
constitutional validity of the federal rules.313 Second, the Fifth
Circuit, following the D.C. Circuit’s lead, applied Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.’s principle that states that rules that only govern
“the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights
themselves.”314
Finally, because the anti-SLAPP law was
inapplicable, so were its attendant attorney’s fees, costs, and
sanctions provisions.315
The Second Circuit also held in La Liberte v. Reid316 that
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable in federal court.317
In La Liberte, plaintiff sued a tv news personality for defamation
on social media.318 Plaintiff had spoken at a city council meeting
in opposition to California’s immigration sanctuary-state law.319
Following the city council meeting, an activist posted a picture
online of plaintiff with an open mouth standing next to a
minority teenager.320 Defendant Reid retweeted the photo at
least twice: on one occasion, she attributed racist remarks to
plaintiff.321 On another occasion, defendant juxtaposed plaintiff’s
photo with that of a 1957 photo of a white woman “screaming
execrations at a Black child trying to go to school.”322 Plaintiff
alleged that defendant defamed her and sued in the U.S. Eastern
District of New York.323
Defendant moved to dismiss. Defendant filed a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as well as an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike based on California law.324 The district court dismissed
312

Id.
Id.
314
Id. at 248.
315
Id. at 247 n.6.
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966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020).
317
Id. at 88.
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Id. at 83.
319
Id.
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Id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id. at 85. Federal diversity courts in New York apply New York conflict of
laws rules to defamation claims. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in [a
diversity of citizenship case] must conform to those prevailing in [the] state courts
[where the federal court sits].”). New York’s conflict of laws rules provide that, for
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the complaint and struck it also under the California anti-SLAPP
statute. The district court then awarded attorney’s fees and
sanctions. Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit.325
The Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that
the California anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable in federal
court because it conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12 and 56.326 Following the lead of its sister-circuits,
the Second Circuit applied Shady Grove’s controlling test:
whether the anti-SLAPP statute’s pretrial dismissal provisions
answer the same question as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.327 The court held that they did.328 Thus, under Shady
Grove, there was a conflict.329 The court began its analysis with
noting that the California courts had construed the anti-SLAPP
statute as being no more than a procedural device to ferret out
meritless claims.330 Then, the appellate court considered its
sister-circuit rulings, some for and some against applying antiSLAPP statutes.331 But in looking at the Supreme Court’s
controlling Erie test—i.e., Shady Grove’s answer-the-samequestion test—the Second Circuit sided with the D.C., Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits.332
In the Second Circuit’s view, the anti-SLAPP statute gives a
different answer from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
when a federal court should dismiss a case pretrial. Beginning
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Supreme Court precedent, the
Second Circuit reasoned that when a complaint pleads plausible
facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, that is enough
to survive a dismissal.333 There is no probability standard.334
multistate defamation cases where a defamatory tweet posted on the world-wide
internet is a multi-state tort, the plaintiff’s domicile is controlling for choice-of-law
purposes. See Lee v. Bankers Tr. Co., 166 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1999); accord
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 (AM. L. INST. 1971). Thus, for a
California plaintiff like La Liberte suing based on a multi-state defamatory tweet,
the law of her domicile is controlling and would govern in federal court. See Lee, 166
F.3d at 545.
325
La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 83.
326
Id. at 87–88.
327
Id. at 87.
328
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Id. at 85.
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Id. at 86–87.
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Id. at 87–88.
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Id. at 88–89.
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Yet, the anti-SLAPP statute in contrast requires that a
complaint meet its requirements or face dismissal and gauges
compliance using a probability standard.335 Moreover, unlike
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, which guarantees a non-movant a trial when
there are material factual disputes and the possibility of
prevailing on the merits, the anti-SLAPP statute, in contrast,
imposes a different standard.336 That statute requires a nonmovant to show that she would likely (not possibly) succeed at
trial.337
Thus, the two laws answered the same question
differently. Under Shady Grove, as the two laws conflicted, the
federal rules controlled.338
The Second Circuit also held that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were valid.339 In that court’s view, although the
Supreme Court had time and again upheld the validity of the
federal rules, it had no problem conducting an independent
analysis.340 The court held that the anti-SLAPP provisions were
procedural because they only regulated the procedure for
vindicating litigants’ rights.341
Thus, under longstanding
Supreme Court precedent, those laws were procedural——i.e.,
the proper domain of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.342 As
a result, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not abrogate
substantive laws.343 Finally, because the anti-SLAPP statute
was inapplicable in federal court, its attendant attorneys’ fees
and costs could not apply because they hinge on a court granting
a dismissal motion using the anti-SLAPP provisions.344
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Evolving Understanding of Shady Grove
and the Resulting Complexity
The Tenth Circuit has—like many of its sister circuits—also
held that New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable in
federal court.345 Although the Tenth Circuit adheres to the
335
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Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 673
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majority position, it takes a different route to get there.346
Rather than applying the majority opinion in Shady Grove, the
Tenth Circuit instead applies Justice Stevens’ concurrence as the
controlling opinion.347
That view—that treats a separate
concurrence as controlling in place of a majority opinion348—
represents an inapt reading of Shady Grove. And even under the
Marks v. United States framework,349 which treats the narrowest
concurring opinion as controlling when the Supreme Court is
fragmented,350 Justice Stevens’ opinion does not represent the
narrowest holding in Shady Grove.
This section begins with looking at the Tenth Circuit’s
evolving understanding of Shady Grove and then considering
whether the Tenth Circuit is correct in holding that Justice
Stevens’ separate concurrence in Shady Grove is controlling.
Finally, we consider how the Tenth Circuit has so far resolved
anti-SLAPP questions.
1.

The Tenth Circuit’s Evolving Understanding of Shady Grove

In life, as in law, asking the wrong question almost always
leads to the wrong conclusion.351 That has proven true with the
Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Shady Grove. Begin with the
obvious question: does Shady Grove not have a majority
opinion?352 In Garman v. Campbell County School District No.
1,353 the Tenth Circuit’s first precedential opinion interpreting
Shady Grove, the court determined that Shady Grove had no
majority opinion.354 Instead, the Tenth Circuit concluded Shady
Grove only had a plurality opinion, followed by a concurrence.355
That, in turn, led the court to ask itself (in cursory fashion) what

346

Id. at 668.
Id.
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Id.
349
430 U.S. 188, 193–94 (1977).
350
Id. at 193.
351
See generally Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 140 S. Ct. 2082,
2090 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court, in my view, asks the wrong
question and gives the wrong answer.”).
352
That would seem the most natural place to start because, after all,
concurrences and dissents have no legal force in the wake of a controlling majority
opinion. See, e.g., Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1511 (2020)
(explaining that, generally, “concurrences and dissents . . . carry no legal force”).
353
See generally 630 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2010).
354
Id. at 983 n.6 (noting only plurality and concurrence).
355
Id.
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was the narrowest concurring opinion under the Marks rule,
which would represent the controlling opinion.356 On closer
inspection, however, the Tenth Circuit short-changed Shady
Grove, which, as noted, generated a controlling majority opinion,
a plurality, a concurrence, and another 5-justice majority from
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.357 Asking the wrong question led the
Tenth Circuit to the wrong answer: that Justice Stevens’
concurrence is controlling.358
From then on, the Tenth Circuit has merely perpetuated the
error. In a shining example of the rule that one panel cannot
overrule another, even in the face of obvious error,359 the Tenth
Circuit confirmed in James River Insurance v. Rapid Funding
LLC,360 that Justice Stevens’ Shady Grove concurrence was the
controlling rule in the circuit. 361
But there are signs that the Tenth Circuit has retreated
from its near unquestioned embrace of Justice Stevens’
concurrence. Beginning with Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home
Ltd.,362 a case about state law damage caps under Oklahoma law,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shady Grove is the controlling Erie analysis.363 But by referring
to Shady Grove, it was unclear whether the Tenth Circuit was
referencing the majority, plurality opinion, or Justice Stevens’
concurrence. The next case, Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick,
Gable, Golden, Nelson, P.C.,364 cleared away some of that
uncertainty.365 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged, for the first
time in a precedential opinion, that Shady Grove had a majority
356
Id. We note that the Tenth Circuit gave thrift attention to the Marks rule
and its attendant analysis. See id. That rule counsels courts to look to the concurring
opinion that concurred on the narrowest grounds. See, e.g., id. Was Justice Stevens’
opinion concurring on the narrowest ground? The Tenth Circuit, as we note, has
never issued a meaningful analysis to that question. Because that question is critical
to the applicability of anti-SLAPP statutes, we will tackle that issue infra. See
discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
357
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 395,
396–406 (2010); id. at 406–16 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); id. at 416–36 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 436–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
358
See Garman, 630 F.3d at 983 n.6.
359
In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993).
360
See generally 658 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2011).
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Id. at 1217.
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871 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2017).
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Id. at 1162.
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956 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2020).
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opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, that held that “a valid Federal
Rule prevails over state law if the Federal Rule ‘answers the
same question as the state law or rule.’ ”366
The Tenth Circuit’s most notable acceptance of Shady
Grove’s majority opinion came in Stender v. Archstone-Smith
Operating Trust.367 In Stender, the appellate court had to decide
whether Colorado’s costs statute—which was broader than what
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 allows—applied in federal court.368 After
noting the limited nature of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54—the federal costs
rule—the appellate court turned to the ultimate question:
whether the state law applied in federal court.369 The court held
that it did not.370 In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit
applied Shady Grove’s majority opinion,371 and in the process
acknowledged that Shady Grove contained a controlling majority
opinion, as well as a plurality, and a concurrence.372
In the end, the court applied both the majority opinion and
Justice Stevens’ concurrence. Turning first to the majority
opinion, the Tenth Circuit considered whether both Rule 54 and
Colorado’s costs provision answered the same question.373 The
court had no difficulty holding that the two laws did answer the
same question about a prevailing party’s permissible recoverable
costs.374 The court held that the two laws answered the same
question differently: federal law allowed fewer items as costs,
while Colorado law permitted more.375 Thus, under Shady Grove’s
majority opinion, the state law was inapplicable.376
But the court also applied Justice Stevens’ concurrence
because, as noted, Tenth Circuit precedent holds that separate
opinion controlling.377 In Stender, however, the Tenth Circuit
found that both the Shady Grove majority and concurrence led to
the same conclusion: that the state costs statute was
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inapplicable.378 To begin with, the court noted that nothing about
the state costs statute showed that it was a part of Colorado’s
“judgment about the scope of state-created rights or remedies.”379
In fact, the cost statute was of general application and applied to
all claims, even those based on federal law.380 In Shady Grove,
Justice Stevens’ concurrence stated that generally applicable
state laws do not reflect a judgment about the scope of a given
remedy.381 The Tenth Circuit, however, suggested in dicta that
the result “might” have been different under Justice Stevens’
concurrence if the state law only targeted specific areas of law.382
But the court declined to determine whether Justice Stevens
concurred on the narrowest grounds.383
2.

Is Justice Stevens’ Concurrence in Shady Grove the
Controlling Opinion?

The Tenth Circuit has held that Justice Stevens’ partial
concurrence in Shady Grove is controlling.384 Is that correct? We
contend that it is not. That question has added importance now
because the Tenth Circuit has embraced both the Shady Grove
majority and Justice Stevens’ concurrence, which in a given
situation (especially because of the different iterations of antiSLAPPs statutes that exist385), could lead to different
outcomes.386
Under the Marks rule, if a splintered Supreme Court decides
an issue without amassing five majority votes, the controlling
opinion is that of the “[m]embers who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.”387
The most straightforward
378
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Id. at 946–47 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393, 423, 432 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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See Metabolic Rsch., Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“[D]eeper inspection has persuaded us that, while all of the [anti-SLAPP] statutes
have common elements, there are significant differences as well, so that each state’s
statutory scheme must be evaluated separately.”).
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See, e.g., La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 86 n.3 (2d Cir. 2020) (collecting
cases and showing different outcomes reached, in part, because the anti-SLAPP
statutes at issue were different with distinct effects); see generally Stender, 958 F.3d
at 945–47.
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Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citations omitted).
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applications of the Marks rule are when a concurring opinion is a
logical subset of a broader plurality opinion.388 But what then is
the rule when the Court splinters into a 4-1-4 split? In other
words, what is the controlling rule when a concurrence goes
beyond the scope of the plurality—in that it embraces a broader
view than the plurality of the Court—and also the dissent? On
this score, “Marks is problematic.”389 That is because to apply the
Marks rule in that situation would give a single opinion—that
does not even enjoy majority approval—unmerited precedential
prominence.390 Even the Tenth Circuit does not apply the Marks
rule when the “plurality and concurring opinions take distinct
approaches” and, in reality, the opinions supporting the
judgment “are mutually exclusive.”391
It is clear that Shady Grove must be subject to a complex
Marks rule analysis. In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens joined the
plurality, forming a majority, in holding that when a state rule
answers the same question as a federal rule, state law must yield
if the federal law is valid.392 But Justice Stevens split with the
plurality on whether Federal Rule 23 was valid and consistent
with the Rules Enabling Act.393
On the second prong of the analysis, Justice Stevens sought
to limit the reach of the Court’s decision in Sibbach v. Wilson.394
Sibbach held that, under the Rules Enabling Act, those federal
rules that regulated procedure in diversity jurisdiction cases are
valid.395 In Shady Grove, however, Justice Stevens sought to
qualify Sibbach whenever a federal rule affected the substantive
aspects of a state law, and in doing so, created a disparity in
outcomes between state and federal courts.396 The plurality
strongly disagreed with Justice Stevens on this point; it refused
to accept Justice Stevens’ intended course because it would have

388
King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v.
Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006).
389
King, 950 F.2d at 781–82.
390
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391
Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d at 1151.
392
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 418 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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Id. at 432.
394
Id. at 427–28; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
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Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427–28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
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effectively rolled back Sibbach.397 Understood in that sense,
Justice Stevens’ approach went further than the plurality in that
it would have effectively overruled, in part, or qualified a
governing Erie precedent.398
Under these circumstances, Justice Stevens’ concurrence
does not represent controlling law under the Marks rule. As
Justice Stevens’ concurrence does not represent the middle
ground of the dissent, which did not address the issue, and the
plurality, which held that Justice Stevens went further than it
did in seeking to qualify controlling precedent, Marks does not
make Justice Stevens’ separate opinion controlling law.399
Indeed, even Tenth Circuit precedent would seem to suggest
that, under these circumstances, Justice Stevens’ concurrence
should not become controlling law.400 Writing extra-judicially, a
slate of prominent federal judges—including then-Judges
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh and Tenth Circuit Judge Hartz—have
also agreed that Justice Stevens’ separate concurrence in Shady
Grove is not controlling law.401
3.

The Tenth Circuit’s Take on Anti-SLAPPs: New Mexico’s
Anti-SLAPP Law

The Tenth Circuit has fully addressed anti-SLAPP statutes
only once in a published opinion. In Los Lobos Renewable Power,
LLC v. Americulture, Inc.,402 the Tenth Circuit examined whether
the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court in
diversity jurisdiction cases.403 Before addressing that issue, the
Tenth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to entertain
an interlocutory appeal from an order denying the anti-SLAPP
motion.404 The court ruled that it had jurisdiction under the
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See BRYAN A. GARNER, NEIL M. GORSUCH & BRETT M. KAVANAUGH ET AL.,
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 586 (2016) (then-Judge Kavanaugh was correct
that Justice Stevens’s separate opinion in Shady Grove did not overrule Sabbach).
402
885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018).
403
Id. at 668.
404
Id. at 664.
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collateral order doctrine.405 In the appellate court’s view, the
district court’s order declining to apply the anti-SLAPP statute
satisfied all the requirements for the collateral order doctrine.406
The district court’s refusal to apply the statute was final: the
court was not going to revisit the issue.407 The question—
whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court—was
distinct from the merits of the case.408 Finally, because the antiSLAPP statute’s stated purpose was to expedite the dismissal of
baseless litigation, a post-litigation remedy would have been
inadequate to accomplish the law’s goal.409 Only an immediate
collateral appeal would suffice.410
Next the Tenth Circuit held that the anti-SLAPP statute did
not apply in federal court.411 The court applied the longstanding
Erie rule: federal courts apply state substantive rules but not
state procedural law.412 Emphasizing the clear wording of the
state statute, the court found that the law merely provided
expedited procedures for dismissing baseless lawsuits.413 The law
did not affect the remedy.414 The New Mexico Supreme Court
had also read the statute that way.415 Finally, turning to the
attorney’s fees and costs provision, the Tenth Circuit took a
different path from other circuits. Building on its conclusion that
the anti-SLAPP statute was procedural, the court viewed the
anti-SLAPP statute’s attorney’s fees and costs provisions (against
both plaintiffs and defendants) through the same lens.416 Since
the costs and attorney’s fees provisions were in the “sanctions”
portion of the statute, the court held that they targeted
defendants who filed frivolous motions.417 Given this context, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned, there was no reason to read the other fee

405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417

Id. at 668.
Id. at 664–65, 668.
Id. at 666–68.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 667, 669, 671–72.
Id. at 664–68.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 668–69.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 669–70.
Id. at 670–71.
Id.
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provision that awarded attorney’s fees and costs against
plaintiffs differently.418
C. The First and Ninth Circuits Uphold Anti-SLAPPs and a
Significant Number of Ninth Circuit Judges Read Shady
Grove Narrowly
The Ninth Circuit led the way in holding that anti-SLAPP
statutes apply in federal court.419 While acknowledging that the
California anti-SLAPP statute—like Federal Rules 12 and 56—
also provides streamlined procedures for pretrial dismissal of a
case, the court, though, applied the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Walker420 and held that the two sets of laws could co-exist
because they operated in separate spheres.421 The Ninth Circuit
has since taken this co-existence logic further, holding that under
the collateral order doctrine, it could entertain interlocutory
appeals on anti-SLAPP appeals.422 The First Circuit has adopted
that reasoning.423
Even though the Ninth Circuit had, at first, applied the
California anti-SLAPP’s provisions that precluded discovery, the
court eventually did an about-face.424 The court found that to
apply those procedures would conflict with Federal Rule 56.425
Generally, Rule 56 contemplates that a non-movant may have to
respond to an evidence based dispositive motion only after having
a chance to discover responsive evidence from the movant.426
Noting concerns about the reach of anti-SLAPP statutes, the
Ninth Circuit has substantially revised its anti-SLAPP
jurisprudence on dispositive motions.427 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished between two kinds of anti-SLAPP motions:
(1) those non-evidentiary motions that only challenge the
418

Id. at 671.
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
420
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741, 744 (1980).
421
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972.
422
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d
828, 831 (9th Cir. 2018).
423
See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86–91 (1st Cir. 2010).
424
Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834.
425
Id.
426
Id.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[T]he plain language
of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery . . . .”).
427
Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834.
419
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allegations in a complaint; and (2) evidentiary motions that seek
dismissal.428 The Ninth Circuit held that a federal court should
apply the same standards as Federal Rule 12 for motions that
challenge the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint,429 but if a
movant presents an evidence-based motion, the Federal Rule 56
standards apply, and discovery must be allowed so that the
responding party has a chance to supplement its evidence before
the trial court rules on the motion.430
V. SHOULD ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES APPLY IN FEDERAL COURT IN
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION CASES? CRITIQUING THE NINTH AND
TENTH CIRCUITS’ PERMISSIVE ANTI-SLAPP LAW VIEWS
As noted, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the California
anti-SLAPP statute’s clear terms to function like a summary
judgment depending on whether a motion to strike under the
statute challenges either the legal or factual sufficiency of a
claim.431 The Ninth Circuit has also taken upon itself—rather
than following the rulings of the California state courts—to
interpret the California anti-SLAPP statute to mirror the
standards for Federal Rules 12 and 56.432 And yet, the Supreme
Court in Shady Grove made it clear that rules that govern
summary judgments and pleadings are “ostensibly procedural.”433
In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply federal
procedural rules and state substantive law.434 And when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure answer the same question as
the state law—as Rule 12 and 56 do about pretrial dismissal of
civil cases—the Federal Rules control.435 Thus, as both the antiSLAPPs and Federal Rules 12 and 56 target the same ends, in
the same way, the Federal Rule should control.
The Tenth Circuit has, in similar vein, suggested in Barnett
v. Hall that if a state law mirrors the functionality and scope of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, then perhaps the state law could
428

Id. at 833–34.
Id. at 834.
430
Id.
431
See id. at 834 (quoting Z.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 239, 240
(9th Cir. 2012)).
432
See id. at 833–34.
433
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010).
434
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938).
435
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399–
401.
429
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apply.436 In making that observation, the Tenth Circuit was
addressing the Oklahoma Citizens’ Participation Act,
Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP statute.437 That statute, courts have
held, is functionally identical to the Texas anti-SLAPP statute
under consideration here.438 Thus, this article’s anti-SLAPP
analysis in this section should also have some bearing on the
Oklahoma anti-SLAPP law.439
If Barnett is anything to go by, both the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have expressed permissive views for anti-SLAPP
statutes that mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.440 But
the Ninth Circuit has gone further: it has adopted that position
and applied anti-SLAPP laws to mirror Federal Rules 12 and
56.441 We contend that those permissive views are flawed and are
foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.
A.

Common Problems with the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s AntiSLAPP Law Permissive Views

Begin with the obvious limitation with the Tenth Circuit’s
observation in Barnett: the panel’s off-hand observation was not
essential to its holding.442 Under established rules on judicial
precedent, that view from the panel was simply dicta.443 Dicta is

436
See Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d
1228, 1238 n.4 (2020).
437
Id. at 1237–38.
438
Krimbill v. Talarico, 417 P.3d 1240, 1244 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (“Oklahoma’s
Act, which became effective in 2014, mirrors that of the Texas Citizens’ Participation
Act . . . .”).
439
For the reader interested in a fuller and more specific discussion of the
Oklahoma anti-SLAPP statute, we would direct that person elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Mbilike M. Mwafulirwa, Second Time’s A Charm: The Oklahoma Citizens’
Participation Act’s Applicability in Federal Court, 89 OKLA. BAR J. 24 (2018); see also
Mbilike M. Mwafulirwa, Suing on Shifting Sands: The Oklahoma Constitution,
Retroactive Legislation and the Scramble for Clarity, 88 OKLA. BAR J. 935 (2017).
440
See Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1237–38; Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v.
Cntr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2018).
441
Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834.
442
Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1237–39; see also Merrifield v. Bd. Cnty. Comm’rs, 654
F.3d 1073, 1084 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is elementary that an opinion is not binding
precedent on an issue it did not address.”).
443
In re Tuttle, 291 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[D]icta are ‘statements
and comments in an opinion that concerning some rule of law or legal proposition
not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case at hand.’ ” (citing
Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir 1995)).
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not binding.444 But even if it were not dicta, on deeper inspection,
both the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s positions are suspect for three
reasons.
First, the Supreme Court in Shady Grove already rejected a
similar so-called co-existence argument. In her dissent in Shady
Grove, Justice Ginsburg suggested that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and
state law could co-exist.445 According to that view, Rule 23 only
addressed the criteria for determining certification, while state
law resolved which claims were eligible for class treatment.446
But the Shady Grove majority rejected that view.447 Shady Grove
reasoned that the purported distinction was artificial since, at
bottom, both laws spoke to when a federal court should certify a
case for class treatment.448 As both state and federal law
answered the same question—class certification—state law was
inapplicable.449 That rationale applies with equal force to
Federal Rules 12 and 56 when compared to parallel anti-SLAPP
dismissal procedures. Both laws answer the same question:
when a court should dismiss a case pretrial, and they both do so
“by winnowing claims and defenses in the course of litigation,
just like Rules 12 and 56.”450
Second, drawing from preemption principles, there seems no
room for state law glosses on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 through 56
represent an integrated program of rules that govern civil cases
in their pretrial posture.451 Together with the judicial glosses
that the Supreme Court has placed on those Federal
Rules,452which have become a part of those Rules,453 and as the
Tenth Circuit has also recognized, it is “very much debatable”
444
Bates v. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] panel of this
Court . . . is not bound by a prior panel’s dicta.” (emphasis omitted)).
445
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 446–47
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
446
Id.
447
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399–401.
448
Id.
449
Id.
450
Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1354 (second emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).
451
See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
452
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009) (pleading rules); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–52 (1986) (summary judgments).
453
As soon as the U.S. Supreme Court adopted those authoritative constructions
of the scope and mode of operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, just as
any federal law, those constructions became “part of the [legal] scheme” of those
rules. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).
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that the Federal Rules do not “cover all the bases . . . leaving
little room” for anything else.454 Indeed, the phrase “leaving little
room” for anything else is cue for federal law preemption.455 The
Supreme Court in Shady Grove intimated as much, when it
framed its Erie direct collision/answer-the-same question
analyses in terms of federal preemption.456
Federal courts recognize three forms of preemption: express,
field, and conflict preemption.457 Express preemption occurs
when Congress enacts specific legislation that withdraws a
subject within its legislative competence from states.458 Field
preemption, on the other hand, arises when federal law occupies
a sphere of federal regulatory competence, and there is a
reasonable inference that Congress has “left no room” for state
law gloss.459 That is particularly the case when Congress has
determined that a given area within its regulatory competence
should be subject to federal rules.460 That is also true when the
law at issue is validly enacted secondary legislation.461 Thus,
when Congress delegates rulemaking authority in a given area,
federal courts then ask whether the resulting secondary law
“evidence[s] a desire to occupy [the] field.”462 To that end, federal
courts consider the degree of pervasiveness of those rules in a
given area “or where there is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude . . . state
law.’ ”463
Finally, conflict preemption exists when it is either
impossible to comply with both state and federal law or when
state law obstructs accomplishment of federal purposes.464 Put
simply, conflict preemption occurs when state law interferes with
454
455
456

Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d at 673 n.8.
See generally id.; see infra text accompanying note 457.
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404

(2010).
457

Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 2008).
Emerson v. Kansas City S. Ry., 503 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007).
459
See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Fid. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
460
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
461
See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153 (holding that in the context
of field preemption, “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than
federal statutes.”).
462
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986).
463
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (first alternation in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
464
Id. at 399–400.
458
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federal policies or goals.465 The line between field preemption
and conflict preemption is a fine one: the Supreme Court has
stated that the two analyses often bleed into each other and that
“field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption.”466
The “ ‘purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”467 As the Supreme Court
has stated, when a state law falls within a field where Congress
has called for uniform national standards, state law conflicts
with federal law.468
Third, what Shady Grove seemed only to suggest, a recent
Supreme Court case appears to confirm: that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure preempt their field of operation.469 The
Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the “[S]upreme
Law of the Land,”470 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “have
the same status as any other federal law under the Supremacy
Clause.”471 During the 2019 Term, a six-justice majority made
clear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are among the
class of federal laws that preempt their field of operation.472
Perhaps others might dismiss the six-justice majority’s position
as mere dicta, but as far as the federal courts of appeal are
concerned, that should not make much of a difference because
they consider themselves (particularly the Tenth Circuit), “bound
by Supreme Court dicta” as much as an actual holding.473 And as
Hanna recognized, through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Congress and the Supreme Court intended that there should be
national uniformity of standards in federal courts on the
465

Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
Eng. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
467
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
468
Eng., 496 U.S. at 79 n.5; see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
469
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1905–06 (2019).
470
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
471
Gallivan v. United States, 943 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 2019).
472
See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 (2010)); accord id. at 1909 (Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ., concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion on that issue).
473
United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007)
(acknlowedging the Tenth Circuit is “bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly
as by the Court’s outright holdings”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Supreme Court dicta ‘have a weight that is greater
than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold’; accordingly,
we do ‘not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.’ ” (emphases
added)).
466
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applicable procedure.474 A motion to dismiss a complaint in
federal court in Los Angeles, California, for example, should
operate the same way in a federal court in Tulsa, Oklahoma.475
Uniformity of interest in applying the Federal Rules is so
important that when an applicable procedural rule controls an
issue, it displaces a parallel state law on the same subject.476
Against that background, and as multiple federal appellate
courts have recognized, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12,
and 56 occupy the field of pretrial dismissal in federal court.477
Alternatively, and as the Supreme Court has held, when a
state law frustrates uniform federal standards in a given area,
field preemption occurs.478 To permit state law to add a gloss to
the Federal Rules, and in doing so, inject dissonance in the
application of federal pretrial dismissal rules, would frustrate
Congress’s design for uniformity.479 When field preemption
applies, as it does with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,480 there
is no room for parallel state law.481
B. Does the Provision for Attorney’s Fees That Is Tied to the
Anti-SLAPP Motion Alter the Analysis?482
Attorney’s Fees awarded under the anti-SLAPP statutes are
procedural for purpose of the Erie doctrine.483 There are three
474
475

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–73 (1965).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12; see also e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009).
476

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–73.
See Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas v. Foreign
Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d
79, 87 (2d Cir. 2020); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885
F.3d 659, 673 n.8 (10th Cir. 2018).
478
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
479
See generally Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–73.
480
See Va. Uranium, Inc., v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (2019) (Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, & Thomas, JJ.) (lead opinion) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
preempt their field of operation); id. at 1909 (Ginsburg, Kagan, & Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion on that issue). See also generally Klocke, 936
F.3d at 247; Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333.
481
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 401 (explaining that when field preemption
applies, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).
482
Because, as noted, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Texas anti-SLAPP
statute is inapplicable in federal court, we will heavily focus on the California
statute in this portion of the analysis that applies (and only discuss the TCPA where
necessary).
483
Federal law already governs the award of costs in federal court. Henkel v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 447 (1932). Federal law also governs
477
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reaosns for this conclusion. First, there are two kinds of
attorney’s fee awards for Erie purposes: substantive and
procedural fees.484 Federal courts apply substantive fees in
diversity jurisdiction cases.485 “Substantive fees are part and
parcel of the cause of action” that is being litigated.486 A cause of
action, in turn, is generally a “legal theory of a lawsuit.”487 This
matters because the California (or even the Texas) anti-SLAPP
statute does not tie the attorney’s fees award to a specific legal
theory, like a bad faith claim; instead, it ties the attorney’s fees
award to the anti-SLAPP dispositive motion.488 In other words, if
a movant prevailed on a defamation cause of action under
Federal Rule 12(b)(6), for example, a California or Texas court
would not award that party attorney’s fees for its success.489 As a
result, the attorney’s fees are not part and parcel of the claim,490
but are part of the motion under the anti-SLAPP statute.491
Thus, the attorney’s fees are not substantive for Erie purposes—
whose fees must be tied to a specific cause of action—to qualify as
a substantive part of state law.492
Second, according to courts in Texas and California, the
attorney’s fees provisions in the TCPA and the Cakifornia antiSLAPP statute’s aim to penalize those who abuse the judicial
the award of sanctions. See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)
(finding federal courts have inherent power to impose attorney fees and expenses as
sanctions against a party). That only leaves the attorney’s fees up for analysis.
484
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011).
485
Id.
486
Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest Energy Inst. Fund. XIII-A, LLP, 888 F.3d
455, 460 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
487
Cause of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (11th ed. 2019).
488
See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2020) (the California antiSLAPP law “awards attorneys’ fees only to ‘a prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike.’ ”); see also generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 & n.6 (5th
Cir. 2019) (the TCPA also only ties attorney’s fees to a dispositive motion under the
anti-SLAPP statute)
489
See Century Sur. Co. v. Prince, 782 F. App’x 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2019) (no
attorney’s fees for non-anti-SLAPP motions); River Oaks L–M Inc. v. Vinton–Duarte,
469 S.W.3d 213, 234 (Tex. App. 2015) (“Attorney’s fees are not recoverable on [a]
defamation claim.”); see also, e.g., Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 21 P.3d 48, 54
(Okla. 2001) (applying Oklahoma law and declining to award fees in defamation
claim).
490
Chieftain, 888 F.3d at 461 (“[W]hen state law provides for the recovery of an
attorney’s fee as part of the claim being asserted . . . the federal court should permit
an award of a fee.” (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2669 10 (5th ed. 2019)).
491
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2021).
492
Chieftain, 888 F.3d at 460.
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system with meritless suit.493 Generally, attorney’s fees that
punish litigants for abusive litigation or tactics are procedural for
Erie purposes.494 Even under longstanding U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, attorney’s fees that “sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process” are generally procedural matters.495
That is exactly the conduct that the anti-SLAPP targets: it
punishes those who file meritless lawsuits solely to silence
critics.496 In other words, the fees target those who abuse the
judicial system.
Third, building on the conclusion that the California and
Texas anti-SLAPP statutes’ attorney’s fees target those who
abuse the judicial system, then those fees would be inapplicable
in federal court on preemption grounds.
As noted, field
preemption applies to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.497
The anti-SLAPP fees do not target a specific cause of action—
instead, the California and Texas Legislatures tied them to a
summary judgment-like dispositive motion.498 The Shady Grove
493
See Whisenhunt v. Lippincott, 416 S.W.3d 689, 696 (Tex. App. 2013) (“The
TCPA . . . seeks to punish or deter, through the assessment of attorney’s fees and
sanctions, those who abuse . . . tort action[s] to silence others.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015); Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52
P.3d 685, 691–92 (Cal. 2002) (California anti-SLAPP statute’s attorney’s fee-shifting
provisions do not “inappropriately punish plaintiffs” for filing baseless litigation);
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1221 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (“Thus,
to deter such chilling, ‘a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be
entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.’ ” (emphasis omitted) (quoting
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c))).
494
See Chieftain, 888 F.3d at 460 (clarifying that for Erie purposes, “procedural
fees are those that are ‘generally based on a litigant’s bad faith conduct in
litigation.’ ”); see also Banner Bank v. Smith, 25 F.4th 782, 790 (10th Cir. 2022)
(holding that a statute whose “primary focus is on a claim’s merit and a litigant’s
bad faith” is procedural for Erie purposes and need not be applied in federal
diversity jurisdiction cases).
495
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 137 S. Ct. 1178,
1186 (2017) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)); contrast
with Chambers, 501 U.S. at 52 (explaining that attorney’s fees were substantive
when a “state statute mandated that in actions to enforce an insurance policy” the
prevailing party could recover fees (emphasis added)).
496
E.g., Metabolife, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1221 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16(c)); see also, e.g., Whisenhunt, 416 S.W.3d at 696.
497
See Va. Uranium, Inc., v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (2019) (Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, & Thomas, JJ.) (lead opinion) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
preempt their field of operation); id. at 1909 (Ginsburg, Kagan, & Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion on that issue).
498
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85–
87 (2d Cir. 2020); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019); cf. Abbas
v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that
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majority opinion was clear that rules on summary judgments and
the like are “procedural” for Erie purposes.499 Understood in that
sense, the TCPA motion and the California special motion to
strike (and its attendant fees) exist as parallel procedural
mechanisms for disposing of meritless civil cases pretrial.500
Generally, when the Federal Rules occupy the field and set
uniform procedural rules governing pretrial litigation and
dismissal in federal court—as Congress did with the existing
federal dispositive motion rules— complimentary state laws that
inject dissonance must yield.501 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a federal court in diversity cases need not apply
state attorney’s fees law, if to do so would “run counter to a valid
federal statute or rule of court.”502
The Court’s analysis in Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.
Woods503 is instructive here. In Woods, the Court rejected a
parallel state law regime that awarded a prevailing party a
categorical ten percent monetary exaction to “penalize” those who
filed meritless and abusive appeals.504 The Court rejected the
state rule because there was already a federal rule—Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38—that addressed that issue.505
That Federal Rule, in contrast to the state rule, applied on a

anti-SLAPPs generally do “not purport to make attorney’s fees available to parties
who obtain dismissal by other means, such as under Federal Rule 12(b)(6)”).
499
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404
(2010).
500
See Soukup v. L. Offs. of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 43 (Cal. 2006) (“The
anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural statute, the purpose of which is to screen out
meritless claims.” (emphasis added)); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586, 590 (Tex.
2015) (same with Texas anti-SLAPP statute); see also generally Klocke, 936 F.3d at
244–49; La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 85–88.
501
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965) (explaining that Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote an important federal
interest–i.e., to ensure uniformity of proceedings in federal court); Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5–7 (state law must yield if it affects the mode of
operation of a controlling federal rule); see generally Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 399, 401 (2012) (holding that when field preemption applies, “even
complementary state regulation is impermissible”).
502
Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
The Supreme Court later clarified in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)
that Alyeska only requires federal courts to apply state “fee-shifting rules that
embody a substantive policy, such as a statute which permits a prevailing party in
certain classes of litigation to recover fees.” Id. at 34.
503
480 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1987).
504
Id. at 4–7.
505
Id. at 5–8.
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“case-by-case” basis.506 To have applied the categorical state
monetary exaction rule, under those circumstances, would have
frustrated Congress’ intended mode of operation of a controlling
federal rule.507 In addition, superimposing a categorical state
monetary exaction on the federal rules would likely have
frustrated a countervailing federal interest: the uniform
application of a controlling federal rule across the country.508
Thus, the state law was inapplicable. In the same way, the antiSLAPP statutes’ categorical abusive and meritless litigation feeshifting regime would similary interfere with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
and a federal court’s inherent power to punish such conduct on a
case-by-case.509 Moreover, applying those unique state antiSLAPP fees rules would likely also inject dissonance in federal
procedural practice.
Finally, as the critical aspect of the anti-SLAPP law—its
dispositive motion—is inapplicable, then so are its attendant
discovery moratorium, burden-shifting frameworks, and
expedited appeal provisions.510
C. Does the Burden-Shifting Framework That Is Tied to the
Anti-SLAPP Motion Make the Statutes Substantive for Erie
Purposes?
We contend that the burden-shifting framework of the antiSLAPP statutes does not affect the burden of proof in federal
diversity actions.511 Ordinarily, in diversity jurisdiction cases,
the burden of proof is a substantive part of state law and applies
in federal court.512 The Supreme Court has, however, tied
substantive burdens of proof to “a claim.”513 Generally, in the
506

Id.
See id.
508
See generally id. at 4–6; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965)
(explaining that Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote
an important federal interest–i.e., to ensure uniformity of proceedings in federal
court).
509
See generally Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d
659, 673 n.8 (10th Cir. 2018); cf. Banner Bank v. Smith, 25 F.4th 782, 790 (10th Cir.
2022) (“[A] rival [state] regime for bad-faith fee-shifting” conflicted with Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11 and a federal court’s “inherent power to punish” abusive litigation conduct”).
510
See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 244–49 (5th Cir. 2019); La Liberte
v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85–88 (2d Cir. 2020).
511
See Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245.
512
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 199 (2014).
513
Raleigh v. Illinois Dep’t of Rev., 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000) (emphasis added).
507
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litigation context, a claim is the same thing as a cause of action—
that is, a legal theory for securing a remedy.514 Put together, the
burden of proof is substantive for Erie purposes when it is part
and parcel of a cause of action.515 This matters as to both the
California and Texas anti-SLAPP statutes because the shifting
burdens of proof in those statutes are tied to their dispositive
motion frameworks, not to any particular cause of action or
claim.516 To test the above thesis, consider, for example, a typical
defamation claim attacked with a standard state law summary
judgment. For a claim attacked outside the strictures of the
California or Texas anti-SLAPP law, the anti-SLAPP burdenshifting framework does not apply.517 Accordingly, the burdenshifting frameworks are tied to procedural aspects of state law.
Which a federal court should ignore under Erie.518
D. Even If Considered on Their Own Terms, the Other Key
Features of Anti-SLAPP Statutes like the Compressed
Pretrial Timeframe, Discovery Moratorium or Expedited
Appeal Provisions Should Not Apply in Federal Court
Most anti-SLAPP statutes have compressed pretrial
timeframes to foster early dismissal of SLAPP lawsuits.519 But
on closer inspection, and when considered within Shady Grove’s
analytical framework, those anti-SLAPP compressed timeframes
514

Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (11th ed. 2019).
See, e.g., Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 2021 (noting that the burden of proof is
substantive when it is tied to a claim or cause of action); see also, Claim, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 311 (11th ed. 2019).
516
See Klocke, 936 F.3d at 247 n.6 (“[T]he burden-shifting [is tied to the] early
dismissal framework.”); Manzari v. Ass’n Newspapers Ltd., 830 F.3d 881, 886–87
(9th Cir. 2016) (“California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides a burden-shifting
mechanism to weed out ‘lawsuits that “masquerade as ordinary lawsuits” but are
brought to deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to
punish them for doing so.’ ”); Kim v. R Consulting & Sales, Inc., 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d
918, 923 (Ct. App. 2021) (“A court conducts a two-step analysis when ruling on a
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statutory framework.”).
517
See generally La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85–89 (2d. Cir. 2020)
(commenting on California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245–47
(commenting on Texas’s anti-SLAPP provisions).
518
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938); see also Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) (noting that
“rules governing summary judgment, pretrial discovery, and the admissibility of
certain evidence” and the like are “ostensibly addressed to procedure” for Erie
purposes).
519
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (b)(1) (West 2015); see also, e.g., TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.003(a) & (b) (West 2019).
515
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are likely incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is because Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 empowers a federal court to set
a timetable for all aspects of federal civil litigation, paying
particular regard to the needs of a given case.520 The case
scheduling deadlines under Rule 16 are case-specific,521 while
both the California and Texas anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with
the design of the Federal Rule by imposing a categorical
abbreviated timeframe when it applies.522 The Supreme Court
has found that a federal and state rule were in conflict when the
categorical aspects of a state rule interfered with a case-by-case
approach of a parallel federal rule.523 That is why even the Ninth
Circuit—the federal court that has spearheaded applying antiSLAPP statutes—has held that the California anti-SLAPP
statute’s compressed timeframe features “fundamentally collide
with federal courts’ rules of procedure.”524
Consider next the discovery-blocking features of anti-SLAPP
laws—those fare no better than anti-SLAPP statutes’ compressed
timeframes. The Federal Rules authorize a court to allow a nonmoving party facing an evidence-based dispositive motion more
time to secure evidence through discovery before being kicked out
of court.525 The California anti-SLAPP statute, however, makes
no similar accommodation: when a movant files an anti-SLAPP
dispositive motion, the statute withholds all discovery tools,
unless the court grants a limited exception.526 That framework
conflicts with the federal design.527 Again, noting these concerns,
the Ninth Circuit has disavowed the anti-SLAPP law’s discoveryblocking features.528
Finally,
most
quintessential
anti-SLAPP
statutes’
interlocutory appeal provisions should not apply in federal court
for two reasons. First, Congress (rather than any state) sets the

520
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc.,
885 F.3d 659, 673 n.8 (10th Cir. 2018).
521
See Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 673 n.8.
522
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f).
523
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5–7; see also Los Lobos, 885
F.3d at 673 n.8.
524
Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2016).
525
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).
526
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2015).
527
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001).
528
Id. (“[T]he discovery-limiting aspects of [this anti-SLAPP law] collide with
the discovery-allowing aspects of Rule 56”).
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appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts.529 Second, for the
limited categories of interlocutory orders that the U.S. Supreme
Court permits immediate appeals, the order should satisfy three
elements: (1) the order must be “conclusive”; (2) the order should
resolve the conclusive issue “separate from the merits”; and
(3) the question should be effectively unreviewable after final
judgment.530
While the Tenth Circuit permitted an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to address a first
impression legal question, the court’s rationale in Los Lobos
forecloses anti-SLAPP interlocutory appeals as a matter of
course.531 As the Tenth Circuit explained in Los Lobos, there are
two kinds of denials of anti-SLAPP motions. The first kind
relates to a denial of relief of a motion filed under a state’s antiSLAPP statute, where the district court considers the statute in
relation to the case-specific facts or evidence.532 The second kind
of denial is one that refuses to apply a given anti-SLAPP statute
“at all.”533
The first denial stems from the district court
considering the merits (or lack thereof) of an anti-SLAPP motion
and ruling.534 But in the second anti-SLAPP motion denial, the
district court only answers an abstract legal question—with no
regard to the case-specific facts or evidence—i.e., whether a state
anti-SLAPP statute should apply in a diversity case.535
The second kind of denial—that is separate from the
merits—falls within the collateral order doctrine, while the first
kind of denial (based on the merits) does not.536 Gauged against
this analytical framework, the Tenth Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction was straightforward in Los Lobos because the appeal
involved the second kind of denial under the New Mexico antiSLAPP law, which did not require an analysis of the case-specific
529

See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010) (“Congress . . . determine[s]
the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction.”); see also Williams v. York, 891 F.3d
701, 706 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Only Congress may determine [our] subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (alteration in original) (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of
Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017))).
530
Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867–68 (1994).
531
See Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659,
665–66 (10th Cir. 2018).
532
Id. at 665.
533
Id.
534
Id.
535
Id.
536
Id.
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facts or evidence.537 Put simply, the order on appeal was
separate from the merits of the case.538 The Second Circuit has
also adopted a similar analytical framework.539 Measured by
these standards, one would expect that the similarly worded
provisions for automatic appellate review in the California antiSLAPP statute,540 for example, would also not satisfy all the
elements of the collateral order doctrine.541 But under the First
and Ninth Circuit’s reading, an order denying an anti-SLAPP
motion does satisfy the collateral order doctrine.542
In any event, as shown, a proper application of Shady
Grove’s analytical framework should ordinarily lead to one
conclusion about the California anti-SLAPP statute (and others
like it): it should not apply in diversity jurisdiction cases.
E. Additional Problems Unique to the Ninth Circuit’s Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s silver-bullet for anti-SLAPPs also has its
own unique problems.
The Ninth Circuit has contorted
unambiguous state anti-SLAPP laws to mirror and function like
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56.543 Five problems
with this solution come to mind, and we address each below.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s solution offends federalism. The
Ninth Circuit’s solution, as noted, imagines a federal court
537

Id. at 665–66.
Id.
539
Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 2016) (rejecting interlocutory
appeal from denial of Vermont anti-SLAPP motion); contrast with Liberty
Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 146–48 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying
California anti-SLAPP statute and entertaining collateral appeal from denial of
anti-SLAPP motion). But see La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85–89 (holding
California anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable in federal court).
540
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West 2015).
541
See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d
828, 835–38 (9th Cir. 2018) (Gould, J., concurring); see also Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Gould, J., concurring).
542
DC Comics v. Pac. Pic. Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2013);
Schwern v. Plunkett, 845 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (permitting an
interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss under the Oregon antiSLAPP statute); Franchini v. Inv.’s Bus. Daily, Inc., 981 F.3d 1, 8 n.6 (1st Cir. 2020)
(finding that “more persuasive authority from other circuits also permits
interlocutory appeals in these circumstances.”). While the First Circuit noted that
the Tenth Circuit had permitted an appeal of a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in
Los Lobos, it glossed over the distinction that Los Lobos drew between an order that
denies applying a state statute at all and one that denies relief on the merits. The
former is appealable, while the latter is not. See Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 665.
543
See Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834–35.
538

64

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1

contorting a clear state statute to conform to the federal court’s
vision for ideal policy.544 The California and Texas anti-SLAPPs
(all of which the Ninth Circuit has applied) require an evidencebased motion to trigger their protections.545 But, as noted, in
Planned Parenthood v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, the Ninth Circuit
has removed this clear requirement permitting instead noevidence anti-SLAPP motions.546 The problem with that solution
is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly told federal courts that
when “the words of [a] statute are unambiguous, the ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’ ”547 More so in the Erie context: the
Supreme Court has made clear that when a state supreme court
has spoken on an issue of state law, its pronouncement is
generally binding on a federal court sitting in diversity.548
Indeed, in Shady Grove, the Court rejected that federal courts
can rewrite unambiguous state law to avoid a collision with a
federal rule.549 Instead, the Supreme Court gives the federal
rules their plain meaning.550
The Ninth Circuit and a majority of its judges have,
however, suggested that Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,551 supports
reading the federal rules narrowly to accommodate anti-SLAPP
laws.552 To begin with, the Supreme Court in Walker rejected the

544
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski,
C.J., concurring) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s judicial revision of the anti-SLAPP
laws “diminished some of the tension between the state and federal schemes, but at
the expense of depriving the state scheme of its key feature: giving defendants a
quick and painless exit from the litigation. What we’re left with after [the Ninth
Circuit’s judicial revisions] is a hybrid procedure where neither the Federal Rules nor
the state anti-SLAPP statute operate as designed.” (emphases added)).
545
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015); Kibler v. N. Inyo Cnty. Local
Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d 193, 197–98 (Cal. 2006).
546
Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834.
547
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank
v. Germain 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
548
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940) (“[In diversity cases,
T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has
spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts . . . .”).
549
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 390, 403–
04 (2010) (rejecting revising state laws to avoid a potential conflict with a Federal
Rule; instead, the Court confined itself to “the law the Legislature did enact”).
550
Id. at 403–04; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (applying
“the plain language of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 56(c)”).
551
See generally Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
552
See U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963,
972–73 (9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that Walker supports reading Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
and 56 narrowly and as not covering the same ground as anti-SLAPP law); accord
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notion of reading an applicable federal rule narrowly.553 In fact,
in Walker, the Supreme Court held that there was no direct
conflict between Fed. R. Civ. P. 3—which addresses how a
litigant commences a civil action in federal court—and state law
that addressed when a litigant satisfied state statute of
limitations requirements.554 Then the Court explained, the two
rules targeted distinct questions, especially since Rule 3 says
nothing about statutes of limitations.555 In contrast, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 and 56 and the anti-SLAPP statutes ultimately seek to
control the same issue: pretrial dismissal of a civil lawsuit.556
And the California anti-SLAPP law (and others like it)
accomplishes its goals “by winnowing claims and defenses in the
course of litigation, just like Rules 12 and 56.”557 In other words,
the state and federal laws serve the same function and
accomplish their goals in the same way because the two answer
the same question. Under Shady Grove and Hanna, when a
federal rule and state law answer the same question, the federal
rule controls.558
Second, the reasoning in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.559 cannot be used to compel federal courts to apply antiSLAPP statutes in diversity cases. The Ninth Circuit believes
that Cohen compels it to apply anti-SLAPP statutes.560 Cohen
upheld a state law that required plaintiffs in shareholder
derivative suits to post bonds before commencing suit.561 The
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
553
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (“This is not to suggest that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed . . . .”); Shady Grove, 559 U.S.
at 403 n.6.
554
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–51.
555
Id. at 750.
556
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972 (stating that the anti-SLAPP statute is geared to
“the expeditious weeding out of meritless claims before trial”); In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 586, 590 (Tex. 2015) (same with Texas anti-SLAPP statute); Kibler v. N.
Inyo Cnty. Loc. Hosp. Dist.,138 P.3d 193, 197–98 (Cal. 2006) (California’s antiSLAPP statute serves similar purpose).
557
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1354 (11th Cir. 2018)
(second emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).
558
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399–401; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72
(1965).
559
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 554–57 (1949).
560
See Newsham, 190 F.3d at 971–73 (relying on Cohen); see also Makaeff v.
Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw, J., concurring)
(relying on Cohen to justify applying anti-SLAPP law).
561
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 544–45, 557.
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Supreme Court upheld the state law, in part, because it did not
conflict with former Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (now Rule 23.1).562 And
the Court also upheld the state bond law to ensure uniformity of
outcomes in federal and state court; the Court applied the
outcome determinative test.563 Together, those reasons compelled
the Supreme Court to apply state law.564 But Cohen cannot save
anti-SLAPP statutes. To begin, Cohen is a pre-Hanna precedent.
That matters because since Hanna, the Supreme Court has held
that the outcome determination test that undergirded Cohen is
no longer the sole criterion in Erie cases.565 Instead, the Court
made clear that it only applied state law in Cohen (and other
similar cases) of the pre-Hanna era because “there [was] no
Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, [so] Erie
commanded the enforcement of state law.”566 But here since Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12 and 56 and state anti-SLAPP laws serve the same
function of pretrial dismissal of meritless civil cases and both
accomplish their goals in the same way, the federal rules
control.567 As a result, Cohen would not control under these
circumstances.568
Third, the Ninth Circuit’s anti-SLAPP statute friendly
views are incorrect because they ignore the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s field preemption effects,569 particularly with the
pretrial dismissal rules.570 Thus, when field preemption applies,
“even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”571 In the
context of pretrial dismissals and case management, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8, 11, 12, 16, 26 and 56 appear to cover all the bases.572 Thus,
562

Id. at 556.
Id. at 555–56.
564
Id. at 557.
565
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
566
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
567
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399–
401 (2010); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–73.
568
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–72.
569
See Va. Uranium, Inc., v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (2019) (Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Thomas, JJ.) (lead opinion); id. at 1909 (Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, JJ., concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion on that issue).
570
See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d. 240 (5th Cir. 2019); See also Abbas
v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328,1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015); La Liberte v.
Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85–88 (2d Cir. 2020).
571
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (emphases added).
572
See Los Lobos Renewable Power v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 673 n.8
(10th Cir. 2018); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013)
563
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to apply the anti-SLAPP law would eviscerate a countervailing
federal interest in the uniform application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.573
Indeed, superimposing state procedural
requirements radically transforms the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure into something neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress approved.574 Unlike California’s anti-SLAPP laws, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose categorical
attorney’s fees or sanctions on losing parties.575 In fact, when
setting the quantum of the awards, for example, federal courts
also factor in whether an affected party can pay the exactions at
issue.576 Most anti-SLAPP laws do not.577
Those categorical aspects of the anti-SLAPP laws conflict
with Supreme Court precedent and they are procedural features
that federal courts should ignore. Consider first the categorical
aspects. As noted, the Supreme Court encountered categorical
aspects of state law in Woods and laid down broad principles that
inform this analysis.578 In Woods, the Court rejected a state law
that imposed a categorical 10% penalty on judgments when the
federal analog of that rule applied a “case-by-case approach.”579
In the same way, the anti-SLAPP law’s categorical features on
fees and sanctions conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s case-by-case approach to awarding monetary
exactions against a losing party.580 Thus, federal courts should
ignore those features.581
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and 56 form “an integrated program” for
determining whether to grant pre-trial judgment in cases in federal court); accord
Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
573
See generally Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472–73 (explaining that Congress enacted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote an important federal interest-i.e., to
ensure uniformity of proceedings in federal court).
574
Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
575
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1336 (4th ed. 2021) (whether to impose
sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees or costs is discretionary on the federal
courts).
576
See Gaskell v. Weir, 10 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases on
sanctions); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (attorney’s fees).
577
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W. 3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016).
578
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–8 (1987).
579
Id. at 4, 7–8.
580
Gaskell, 10 F.3d at 629 (sanctions); Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 (attorney’s
fees).
581
Cf. Woods, 480 U.S. at 4–8 (categorical aspects of state law that run counter
to case-by-case features of analogous federal law were inapplicable).
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Generally, the Supreme Court has sanctioned contorting
state law in the Erie context only when two conditions are met:
(1) there is no controlling federal rule;582 and (2) the at-issue state
law, if applied as is, would adversely affect a countervailing
federal interest.583 When, as in this context, where Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 and 56—just like the anti-SLAPP statutes—target pretrial
dismissal of meritless civil lawsuits, there is no need to “wade
into Erie’s murky waters” or to artificially contract state law.584
A federal court should apply the federal rule and ignore the state
law.585
Fourth, the Ninth Circuit’s watered-down anti-SLAPP
framework creates more problems than it solves. The Ninth
Circuit’s saving interpretation still leaves significant conflicts
between state law and the federal rules unaddressed. Take Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, for example. That rule requires a trial when there
are material factual disputes and the law could afford relief to
the non-movant.586
But, as noted, with anti-SLAPPs, the
existence of material factual disputes alone does not ensure a
trial; the non-movant must still show “clear and specific
evidence,” or “probability” of success, as the case might be.587
What remains unclear under the Ninth Circuit’s approach,
however, is how a federal court should resolve the clear conflict
between Rule 56 standards (disputed material facts warrant
trial) and judicially revised anti-SLAPPs (that impose a trial-like
burden). Has the Ninth Circuit done away with Rule 56
standards, or has it done away with the anti-SLAPP’s framework
altogether and adopted Rule 56 standards in its stead? The court
has not given clear answers.588

582
See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–72 (1965). Hanna makes
clear that if there is a valid controlling federal rule it displaces state law on the
same issue. Id.
583
See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535–38 (1958);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436–38 (1996).
584
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 559, 398–
401 (2010).
585
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–71.
586
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
587
See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a), (b) (West 2019); id.
§ 27.005(b), (c) (“clear and specific evidence”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1)
(West 2015) (“probability” that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim).
588
See Todd v. Lovecruft, No. 19-cv-01751, 2020 WL 60199, at *8 n.7 (N.D. Cal.,
Jan. 1, 2020).
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Fifth, the Ninth Circuit’s approach promotes forumshopping. Initially, the Ninth Circuit decided to apply antiSLAPP statutes to prevent forum-shopping between state and
federal courts.589 But the Ninth Circuit’s interpretative device in
Planned Parenthood undermines that goal. A plaintiff has extra
motivation to file her defamation lawsuit in federal court rather
than state court because, at the sufficiency stage in the Ninth
Circuit, she need not adduce evidence, even though the antiSLAPP laws require it.590 And there is even more motivation for
a plaintiff to file a defamation lawsuit in the Fifth or Second
Circuit, rather than the Ninth Circuit, because the former do not
apply anti-SLAPP statutes, while the latter does.591
VI. CLIFFORD V. TRUMP: A CASE STUDY ON COMITY
In Clifford v. Trump,592 the Ninth Circuit split with the Fifth
Circuit on the applicability of anti-SLAPP statutes, specifically
the TCPA.593 But for venue transfer and choice of law rules,
Clifford v. Trump would likely have been litigated in the Fifth
Circuit, and there never would have been a circuit split. As the
congressionally designated federal appellate court over Texas,
the Fifth Circuit has primary oversight over Texas law appeals in
diversity jurisdiction cases.594 Thus, it is the exception that the
Ninth Circuit hears Texas law diversity jurisdiction cases.
That, in turn, invites the question that is the subject of the
analysis in this section: what role does (or should) sister-circuit
comity play in diversity jurisdiction cases? In the federal court
system, comity is a “principle . . . of paramount importance.”595
Comity governs relations between “courts of the same sovereign”
589

Id.; see also Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973
(9th Cir. 1999).
590
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (2015) (requiring evidence to support
TCPA motion); but see Planned Parenthood v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828,
834 (9th Cir. 2018).
591
See In re Gawker Media LLC, 571 B.R. 612, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(noting that “the failure to apply the anti-SLAPP law would encourage forum
shopping”); see also generally Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 973 (also outlining potential for
forum-shopping if a federal court did not apply anti-SLAPP statute).
592
818 F. App’x 746 (9th Cir. 2020).
593
Id. at 747.
594
See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (placing Texas within the Fifth Circuit).
595
Church of Scientology Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir.
1979), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016).
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and those of “different sovereigns.”596 As a result, comity applies
between state and federal or tribal courts,597 American and
foreign courts.598 At its core, the doctrine serves to spare the
federal courts from the “embarrassment” of contradictory
judgments and duplication of efforts.599 So comity also serves to
prevent forum-shopping among litigants, especially if the
litigation involves a common question.600 For that reason, the
U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned various strands of comity
principles, which find their modern expression in most
abstention doctrines like the “first to file rule.”601
But the doctrine of comity is broader than concurrent
jurisdiction over related cases. Indeed, the concept also seeks to
prevent federal courts from interfering with each other’s
business.602 We have particularly seen this principle at play, for
example, when federal injunctions in one circuit have obvious
effects in another circuit.603 On this score, the Ninth Circuit
probably explained it best:
Principles of comity require that, once a sister circuit has spoken
to an issue, that pronouncement is the law of that geographical
area. Courts in the Ninth Circuit should not grant relief that
would cause substantial interference with the established
judicial pronouncements of sister circuits. To hold otherwise
would create tension between circuits and would encourage
forum shopping.604

596
597

Ulmet v. United States, 888 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1989).
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976).
598
See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 597–600 (9th Cir. 2014) (outlining
principles of international comity); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) (international comity is an abstention doctrine that
“counsels voluntary forbearance when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign also has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction under principles of international law.”).
599
See Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 750.
600
See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (explaining
that comity should “secur[e] uniformity of decision . . . and discourag[e] repeated
litigation of the same question”).
601
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817 (“As between federal district courts, . . . the
general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.”).
602
In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 348 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The doctrine of comity
instructs federal judges to avoid ‘stepping on each other’s toes when parallel suits
are pending in different courts.’ ”).
603
Id.
604
United States v. AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 773 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added).
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Beyond the injunction context, comity considerations also are
central to the way federal courts of appeals develop the law in
diversity jurisdiction cases. The Second Circuit, for example, in a
diversity jurisdiction case involving Tennessee law chose to defer
to the views of the Sixth Circuit—the federal appellate court that
mainly oversees that state.605 Indeed, applying that same comity
rationale, the Federal Circuit, for instance, applies regional
circuit law to non-patent law issues to avoid disturbing the law of
those regional circuits.606
Against that background, one view suggests that the Ninth
Circuit in Clifford should have deferred to the Fifth Circuit on
the Texas anti-SLAPP statute. Just as the Second Circuit
deferred to the Sixth Circuit over Tennessee law, and the Federal
Circuit defers to regional circuits on regional circuit law, the
Ninth Circuit should have also deferred to the Fifth Circuit on a
Texas statute.607
After all, the Fifth Circuit has primary
responsibility over Texas diversity jurisdiction cases.608 And for
that reason, it follows by implication, that the effect of the Texas
anti-SLAPP statute is more notable in the Fifth Circuit than any
other circuit.609 Based on this view, for the Ninth Circuit to issue
a contrary ruling comes at a grave cost: it invites forum-shopping
(the very thing comity seeks to avoid) and injects the specter of
conflicting precedent for other federal courts that have to address
the TCPA’s applicability in diversity jurisdiction cases.610
But comity is not a talismanic card. The federal courts have
discretion whether to honor comity considerations.611 And the
comity considerations are not without their critics. In the years
since the Second Circuit decided to defer to the views of the Sixth
Circuit on Tennessee law, an impressive complement of federal
appellate judges (including two current U.S. Supreme Court
justices, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh) have poured cold

605

Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283–84 (2d Cir. 1981).
Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomed., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
607
See Factors Etc., 652 F.2d at 283–84.
608
See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (placing Texas within the Fifth Circuit); id. § 1332
(diversity jurisdiction).
609
See generally text accompanying supra notes 592–595.
610
See generally Church of Scientology Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t Army, 611 F.2d 738,
750 (9th Cir. 1979); see also generally Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
190 F.3d 963, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1999).
611
See Hawthorne Sav. F.S.B. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir.
2005).
606
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water on the decision in extra-judicial writings.612 For one,
federal courts now can directly certify questions of state law to
state supreme courts to get authoritative views on state law.613
And the U.S. Supreme Court has never endorsed a categorical
rule for non-home-state-federal-courts to defer to the state law
pronouncements by home-state-federal-courts.614 Perhaps that is
why some federal courts—when asked to consider comity
considerations in the context of anti-SLAPP litigation—have flatout declined.615 Against this background, perhaps the Ninth
Circuit did not in fact abuse its discretion. To this, the reader
can add that the U.S. Supreme Court has an interest in having
an issue percolate among the lower courts (even if state law is
involved, especially if there is a federal interest at stake) before
granting certiorari.616
In short, comity is an important consideration for federal
courts when developing state law in diversity jurisdiction cases.
But like most other discretionary judicial tools, its use and
importance varies depending on the circumstances at issue.
VII. THE FEDERAL DIMENSIONS OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES
Suppose a plaintiff asserts a § 1983617 or Title VII618
discrimination claim alongside a state law defamation claim
612

See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT § 73 614–16

(2016).
613

Id.; Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (“Comity is not a
rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency.”).
615
See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d at 79, 86–87 (2020) (The Second Circuit
declined to defer to Ninth Circuit on the applicability of anti-SLAPP statutes in
diversity jurisdiction case on California law based on principles of comity); but see
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d, 138, 148 (2013) (Second Circuit
deferred to Ninth Circuit’s reading of California anti-SLAPP statute).
616
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Calvert v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 1605, 1606 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“The legal question Calvert presents is complex and would
benefit from further percolation in the lower courts prior to this Court granting
review.”); Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Respectfully, it seems to me at
least reasonably possible that the crucible of adversarial testing on which we usually
depend, along with the experience of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and
circuit benches, could yield insights (or reveal pitfalls) we cannot muster guided only
by our own lights.”).
617
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
618
See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.)
614
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(that is traditionally subject to most anti-SLAPP motions). The
key question in this section is this: do anti-SLAPP statutes apply
to claims that arise under federal law? By their design and
broad wording, anti-SLAPP statutes apply to all claims that
implicate matters of public concern.619 So could a defendant rely
on a state anti-SLAPP law to seek dismissal of a federal claim?
As we show, however, federal law claims are cut from a different
cloth: federalism and Supremacy Clause considerations color
those claims. Based on those considerations, the short end of the
matter is that the consensus of the federal courts is that antiSLAPP statutes do not apply to federal claims.
A.

The Federalism Considerations—First Principles

For those federal courts that apply anti-SLAPP statutes,
they do so (1) in diversity jurisdiction cases;620 and (2) because
they claim the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railway Co. v.
Tompkins,621 requires it.622 Erie, however, is “deeply rooted in
notions of federalism.”623 Those notions of federalism limit the
federal government to its sphere of legislative and regulatory
competence, while also giving states ample breathing room to do
the same within their domains.624 So on purely state law issues,
state law ordinarily takes precedence.625 And Erie merely
commandeers federal courts to hold true to that idea, especially if
state law is at issue.626 But when federal law—in the form of
congressional acts or the U.S. Constitution—is at issue, Erie no
longer has a commandeering effect.627 The Erie rule does not
apply to federal laws.628 In other words, a respect for federalism
619

See, e.g., supra notes 78–86.
Thomas Williams, Survey of Federal Courts of Appeals Cases Addressing
Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Federal Court, HAYNES BOONE (Oct. 21,
2019), https://www.haynesboone.com/news/publications/survey-of-federal-courts-ofappeals-cases-addressing-applicability-of-anti-slapp-statutes.
621
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
622
See Newsham v, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th
Cir. 1999); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2010).
623
Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
624
See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
625
See West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940).
626
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79.
627
Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[C]ongressional acts and the Federal Constitution fall outside [the] scope” of Erie).
628
Id.
620
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also envisions that state law should not encroach on federal law’s
sphere of competence or alter its mode of operation.629
In short, when federal law is at issue, a federal court need
not apply state law to those claims because of Erie. As shown,
Erie does not apply to federal claims.
B. Supremacy Clause Considerations
The federalism conclusion above bleeds into the supremacy
clause analysis here. The U.S. Constitution makes federal law
supreme over state law.630 For the Supremacy Clause, federal
law mainly consists of the U.S. Constitution, congressional
statutes, treaties,631 federal regulations and rules,632 as well as
the Supreme Court’s binding judicial pronouncements construing
federal law.633 And when federal law creates a cause of action,
state law cannot alter its mode of operation or immunize certain
elements that federal law penalizes.634 Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court has held that in the context of 42 U.S.C. §1983,
state law cannot immunize conduct that federal statute and
decisional law penalizes.635 Likewise, in the Title VII context, for
example, the Supreme Court engrafted a burden-shifting
framework to claims that rely on circumstantial evidence to
make out a prima facie case for trial.636 That framework is
different in important ways from the prima facie scheme that
some anti-SLAPP statutes require.637 Indeed, once the Supreme
Court lays down an interpretation of the commands of a federal
rule or statute, state law cannot add a gloss or deviate from that
design or immunize actionable conduct.638

629
Cf. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (state law was
inapplicable when it sought to alter the mode of operation of a parallel federal rule);
Bond, 564 U.S. at 221 (federalism confines each sovereign—federal and state—
within its own sphere of competence).
630
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
631
Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2020) (Constitution, federal statutes,
treaties).
632
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (federal
regulations and rules).
633
See James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686–87 (2016).
634
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980).
635
Id.
636
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).
637
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 78–86 (Texas anti-SLAPP statute).
638
See James, 136 S. Ct. at 686–87; see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900
(9th Cir. 2003) (besides Supreme Court holdings, the Court’s modes of analysis are
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Applying a similar framework to the one outlined above, an
impressive complement of federal courts has held that state antiSLAPP laws are inapplicable to federal claims. Their reasons for
doing so have ranged from concerns that anti-SLAPP statutes
might immunize certain speech that is actionable under the
federal anti-discrimination laws or that those who apply state
laws might frustrate the mode of operation of those Federal
Rules.639
CONCLUSION
The last lecture is now at an end. There are four main
takeaways. First, anti-SLAPP statutes are unique state statutes
that target important ends. In most states, the application of
anti-SLAPP laws is a straightforward proposition. In Texas and
California, for example, the state courts have developed a
wellspring of anti-SLAPP jurisprudence. The application of antiSLAPP statutes in those jurisdictions is well laid-out.
Second, there is a well-developed conflict between the
several federal (appellate and district courts) on what to do with
anti-SLAPP statutes. An increasing majority of courts seem
inclined to hold that anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are therefore inapplicable
in diversity jurisdiction cases. When those courts consider the
Shady Grove majority framework, there is little room for
complementary or contradictory state anti-SLAPP dismissal
laws. But a steady number, in minority, taking a leaf from the
First and Ninth Circuits, seem to find that there is room for both
the federal rules and state anti-SLAPPs. Those courts, we
contend, have either ignored Shady Grove or misunderstood it.
That, in turn, leads to this important related point: The antiSLAPP issue has percolated long enough in the lower courts.
The time has come for the Supreme Court to weigh in with an
authoritative answer on this question: do state anti-SLAPP laws
apply in diversity jurisdiction cases?
also binding); accord FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir.
2019).
639
See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]ntiSLAPP statute does not apply to federal law causes of action.”); In re Bah, 321 B.R.
41, 46 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); Dr.’s Data Inc. v. sBarrett., No. 10-C-03795, 2011 WL
5903508, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2011); Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12–cv–184, 2017 WL
4402431, at *30 (D. Vt. Sept. 29, 2017); Mathiew v. Subsea 7 (US) LLC, No. 4:17–
CV–3140, 2018 WL 1515264, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018).
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Third, the circuit splits on anti-SLAPP statutes test the
federal court’s commitment to comity. Ordinarily, the federal
courts should avoid inconsistent pronouncements, especially
when there is room to avoid them. It is one thing for different
federal courts, considering different state laws, to reach different
outcomes. But it is quite another for those courts to split on the
same state laws, especially when there are tools (like certification
of state law questions) that help clarify state law. What is more,
in appropriate cases, comity could help promote judicial economy,
prevent inconsistent results, and forum-shopping, especially
when a prior federal court decision is not palpably wrong.
Fourth, state anti-SLAPP statutes are inapplicable to federal
law claims. The Supremacy Clause makes this a no-contest.
When Congress or the federal courts establish the parameters
and the mode of operation of a federal rule, generally, state law
that seeks to disrupt that design faces a high bar to survive
preemption. And the Erie rule that is the basis for applying antiSLAPP laws in the first-place targets state laws, not federal
rules. Together, those two concepts limit state anti-SLAPP laws
to state law in those federal courts that apply them.

